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This study investigates whether the shareholder, stakeholder and customer-oriented theories on 
the objective of the firm are reflected in modern financial textbooks, and in the Mission, Vision, 
and Values statements of the JSE TOP40 firms.  
The literature review discusses the shareholder, stakeholder and customer-oriented theories of 
the firm, among others, and shows that there is no consensus between finance researchers on 
the objective of the firm, with opposing views presented.  
The research approach adopts qualitative analysis as the method for this study, as it is deemed 
to be suitable for pattern recognition in large sets of data. The data consisted of twenty financial 
textbooks, and the MVV statements of the JSE TOP40 firms. Both the data sets were analysed 
to identify the shareholder, stakeholder and customer-oriented objectives of the firm using the 
word frequency and coding queries in software NVivo.  
The finding in respect of financial textbooks indicates that seventeen textbooks advocated for 
a shareholder objective, two advocated for a stakeholder, and one for a customer-oriented 
objective of the firm. The JSE TOP40 firms’ finding indicates that seventeen pursued a 
stakeholder objective, twelve pursued a customer-oriented objective, and eleven pursued a 
shareholder objective.  
The study establishes that the shareholder, stakeholder and customer-oriented theories of the 
firm’s objective are reflected better in the MVV statements of JSE TOP40 firms, than in 
financial textbooks. This highlights a disconnection between financial textbooks, where the 
shareholder objective of the firm was found to be dominant, and the JSE TOP40 firms’ findings 
where the debate concerning the three objectives was more evenly spread.  
This study recommends that South African academic authors should update their financial 
textbooks to reflect more emphasis on the stakeholder and customer-oriented theories of the 
firm’s objectives, as being pursued by the JSE TOP40 firms.  
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“For many years there has been a continuing debate in corporate law circles regarding the 
precise objective of public companies.” – Tackling the Issue of the Corporate Objective: An 
Analysis of the United Kingdom’s ‘Enlightened Shareholder Value Approach’ (Keay, 
2007:577). 
The birth of the debate on the precise objective of firms can be traced back to the early 1930s.  
At that time the main participants were two US professors: Adolf Berle, who maintained that 
directors had duties only to its shareholders, and Edwin Dodd, who maintained that a firm had 
responsibilities to its customers, employees, and public in addition to its shareholders (Keay, 
2007:581). 
At the core of this debate were the shareholder and stakeholder views that were competing and 
contrary to each other (Shankman, 1999:320). It was from these two views that the “Great 
Debate” on the objective of a public firm was born (Chu, 2012:165). Yet Jensen (2002:300) 
pointed out that the debate on the objective of firms was being wrongly framed as shareholders 
versus stakeholders, and should instead focus on whether a firm needs to have a single 
shareholder objective, or multiple stakeholder objectives.  
The two main drivers of the debate on the objectives of a public firm are considered to be the 
shareholder and stakeholder theories (Keay, 2007:577). The shareholder theory of the firm’s 
objectives is generally accepted to be applicable in the Anglo-Saxon countries: Australia, 
Canada, New Zealand, UK, and US, whereas the stakeholder theory of the firm is embraced by 
many countries in Europe, particularly in Germany (2007:578).  
Despite voluminous literature, questions on the objective of the firm, and whose interests it 
should serve, remain unanswered, conclusively, from both the empirical and theoretical 
standpoints (Dolenc, Stubelj & Laporšek, 2012:51). Indeed, debate on the firm’s objective is 
far from being finished, as “scholars and courts” have been arguing for a long time over the 
objective of the firm, and until now have held different views (Sundaram & Inkpen, 
2004a:350).  
This study therefore presents an analysis of how the shareholder, stakeholder, and customer-
oriented theories on the objective of the firm are reflected in financial textbooks, and in the 
Mission, Vision, and Values statements of JSE TOP40 firms.  
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The reason for analysing financial textbooks arises because it is important to assess what 
finance students in South African business schools are taught on the objective of the firm. 
These schools often recommend and use South African authored books as the primary course 
text, and thus the need arises to analyse whether these local edition adequately reflect the 
diverse opinions of the ongoing firm objective debate. Discussions on the objective of a firm 
often originate in the introductory chapter of financial textbooks, and in some instances are 
carried forward. Therefore, an assessment on which of the three theories is given more 
prominence throughout is vital. 
After all, when these graduates transit to the corporate world, and work up to management 
positions in their careers, they are likely to apply this textbook knowledge. They may influence 
business decisions with relevance to the objective their respective firms should pursue. If 
graduates are equipped with wider knowledge on the various theories of the firm, it will enable 
them to pursue the appropriate objective for their firm. Any such appropriate objective should 
balance the interests of all parties that interact with the firm, and may be crucial for the firm’s 
long-term success. 
The JSE was established in 1887 and is the largest stock exchange in Africa, and also one of 
the top twenty stock exchanges in the world in terms of size (Majapa & Gossel, 2016:35).  The 
significance of analysing the JSE TOP40 index was that it lists the top forty firms in terms of 
market capitalisation. These firms play an important part in contributing to South Africa’s 
economy. They provide various goods and services which are consumed by millions of people 
on a daily basis, and also create employment in the process, making them an integral part of 
our lives. 
This study contributes to the literature on corporate governance. It is the first of its kind in a 
South African context insofar as it analyses how the shareholder, stakeholder, and customer-
oriented theories of the firm’s objective are reflected in the MVV statements of JSE TOP40 
firms, and in financial textbooks. This analysis allows for a comparison between what is taught 
to students in business schools on the objective of the firm, and what is actually practiced by 
the management of the firms listed on the JSE TOP40 index. This study is of interest to finance 
academics, financial textbook authors, and possibly to policy makers. 
The study is structured as follows. The literature review in chapter two examines the debate 
between proponents of the shareholder, stakeholder, and customer-oriented theories of the firm, 
on which one of these theories is the appropriate choice. Other newer theories on the objective 
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of the firm are presented as well. The research approach described in chapter three reiterates 
the research question, then describes the data used in the study for financial textbooks and JSE 
TOP40 firms, and the method adopted for the analysis of the data. The findings are presented 
in chapter four and are followed in chapter five by a discussion of the findings, and the 
implications drawn. Finally, the conclusion highlights the findings, the key points from each 




2. Literature review 
 
2.1 Background 
The theories on the objective of the firm can be classified into two categories: Economic 
Theories and Behavioural Theories (Anderson, 1982).  
The Economic Theories focus on the financial performance of firms and are further subdivided 
into the neoclassical model, the market value model, and the agency costs model (Anderson, 
1982:16). The neoclassical model argues that the objective of the firm is profit maximisation, 
while the market value model argues that the objective of the firm is to maximise its present 
market value, while the agency costs model argues that agents (management) should maximise 
principals’ (shareholders) welfare.  
The Behavioural Theories focus on what firms ought to do, and are further subdivided into the 
behavioural model and the resource dependence model (Anderson, 1982:18). The behavioural 
model views the firm as being a coalition of members such as customers, employees, managers, 
regulatory agencies, shareholders, suppliers amongst others; its objective is to satisfy the 
individual goals of the coalition members. The resource dependence model views the firm as 
having critical resources that it needed to ensure continuous supply of, in order to meet the 
needs and desires of its coalition members. 
Yet, firms are a business and legal entities, in which shareholders are represented by the number 
of shares they hold in the firm (Correia, Flynn, Uliana & Wormald, 2015:I-6). The shareholders 
of the firm, while not involved in day-to-day management, appoint the board of directors, may 
receive dividends, participate in the annual general meeting, and vote on major decisions to 
steer the firm (Correia et al., 2015:I-7). The shareholder theory of the firm states that the 
primary duty of a firm’s manager is to enrich its shareholders, and pursue profit maximisation 
(Smith, 2003:85). The shareholder theory is a neoclassical model of the objective of the firm. 
However, a firm does not operate in isolation. Various individuals or groups provide and 
receive goods and services from the firm; these parties include investors, employees, suppliers, 
customers, shareholders, creditors, government, and society (Metcalfe, 1998:30). All such 
parties are considered to be to the stakeholders of the firm (1998:30). The stakeholder theory 
of the firm states that the primary duty of a firm’s manager is to balance the interests of all its 
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stakeholders even if this is done at the expense of shareholders (Smith, 2003:85). The 
stakeholder theory is a behavioural model of the objective of the firm. 
A firm must produce things that people want and do so efficiently such that consumers are able 
to acquire its products at a good price (Fontrodona & Sison, 2006:39). It was the duty of a firm 
to provide goods and services that meet the real needs of the customer (2006:40). The primary 
concern of a business is therefore to identify and satisfy its customers’ needs (O'Cass, 1996:38). 
The customer-oriented theory of the firm states that the purpose of a business is to identify the 
needs, wants and values of the target market to satisfy customers’ desires more effectively than 
its competitors (1996:39). The customer-oriented theory is a resource dependence model of the 
objective of the firm. 
2.2 The shareholder theory of the firm 
During the 1950s and 1960s, US corporations experienced robust growth and dominated world 
markets (Clarke, 2013:18). In this era, corporate growth and brand prestige were sought as the 
ultimate goals by technocratic managers. Profit maximisation was shunned, and cooperation 
with the government was the primary corporate concern at the expense of market relations 
(Henwood, 1997:259). Shareholders at the time were considered to be passive and functionless, 
while they enjoyed the gains from the firm’s growth but without any effort or understanding of 
business risks (Galbraith, 1967:356). 
When the US entered a severe recession between 1973 and 1975, US corporations could not 
compete effectively with their European and Japanese counterparts in vital consumer markets 
(Clarke, 2013:18). Wall Street pushed for the creation of corporations whose interests were in 
managing multiple businesses with a pure focus on financial performance (Clarke, 2013:18). 
Subsequently, US corporations were faced with suppressed growth because of tighter fiscal 
and monetary policies; at the same time, employees faced constrained wages to raise the firm’s 
bottom line, and therefore competition from global deregulation was felt intensely (Clarke, 
2013:18). In due course, it became accepted that pursuing financial interests was the main 
objective for large corporations (Henwood, 1997:262). 
The rapidly evolving events in the 1970s set a fertile scene for Milton Friedman, an influential 
economist, to put in place the modern foundation for firms to pursue profit maximisation as 
their corporate objective (Friedman, 1970:33); this is known as shareholder-value capitalism. 
In his famous article, Friedman (1970:32) disagreed with businessmen defending the free-
enterprise system in which a firm has social responsibilities. The notion that businesses should 
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not merely concern themselves with profits but should also have a social conscience, provide 
employment, eliminate discrimination or avoid pollution, was unacceptable. Friedman referred 
to such businessmen as “unwitting puppets” who were preaching pure and unadulterated 
socialism, and undermining the basis of a free society (1970:32). 
Friedman (1970:32) argued that only people have responsibilities, and a firm is an artificial 
person. Thus, a business as a whole cannot have responsibilities even in any vague sense. 
According to his view, any discussions on social responsibilities of business were deemed to 
display analytical looseness and a lack of rigor. If a firm were to be concerned with the 
community instead of focusing on profits, this would lead to totalitarianism. Only the 
shareholders, and not management, could decide what social initiatives to take part in. 
A free enterprise was defined as one where the CEO had direct responsibility to its employer 
(Friedman, 1970:32). That type of business conducts itself according to the wishes of the 
owners, and generally makes as much money as possible within the law. If a business has a 
social responsibility, then that responsibility is only to use its resources and engage in activities 
to increase its profits. Nevertheless, the firm must operate in ways allowing open and free 
competition without resorting to deception or fraud (1970:33).  
In adding support to the shareholder theory, Jensen and Meckling (1976:305) looked to develop 
a single financial theory of corporate governance that could merge Anglo-American policies 
and practices. In a paper, these writers stated (1976:312) that most organisations were legal 
fictions which served as a connection for contracts among individuals. Therefore, it would be 
seriously misleading to associate corporations with any social responsibility (1976:313). The 
paper proposed that the chief executive or agent should be provided appropriate incentives such 
as stock ownership to maximise shareholders’ or the principal’s welfare. This would ensure 
that the principal and the agent have aligned interests (1976:309). This approach was in 
agreement with Friedman’s philosophy, in which the objective of a business was to serve its 
shareholders. Jensen and Meckling (1976:310) provided a mechanism to ensure how this goal 
could be best achieved, by identifying the agency problem. 
Friedman (1970) and Jensen and Meckling (1976) thus concurred in their view that a firm had 
no obligations to social responsibilities, and only had responsibilities towards enriching its 
shareholders. Friedman was later awarded a Nobel Prize in Economics, and the strong influence 
of his view was perhaps best reflected by Jack Welch who was once the CEO of GE.  
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Thus, during his two decades at GE, between 1981 and 2001, Welch changed the fortunes of 
GE increasing its market capitalisation from US $13 billion to $484 billion (Martin, 2010:61). 
In his speech ‘growing fast in a slow-growth economy,’ Welch outlined his beliefs on cost 
cutting, selling underperforming business units and aiming for profit growth rate at GE to be 
higher than global economic growth (Guerrera, 2009); this approach thus laid down the 
foundation for GE to pursue shareholder wealth maximisation.  
Would it therefore be appropriate for all firms to pursue a shareholder-value objective? On the 
contrary: Welch openly admitted much later on “that on the face of it, pursuing shareholder 
value was the world’s dumbest idea” (Guerrera, 2009). The fact that shareholder theory did not 
acknowledge that a firm had social responsibilities made it outdated (Grossman, 2005:573), 
and the markets may have moved away from pure profit maximisation (2005:596). These are 
some of the arguments that show the shareholder theory to be one of the elements in the debate 
on a firm’s objective, but not the conclusive element. 
2.3 The stakeholder theory of the firm 
At the beginning of the twentieth century, the “managerialist philosophy” was adopted by large 
US corporates: according to this theory, a firm had duties towards customers, creditors, 
employees, suppliers, and the wider society (Stout, 2013:2004). This position represented the 
status quo until the events of the 1970s caused the focus of firms to shift away from 
managerialism to maximising shareholder value. This shift was attributed to the adoption of 
Jensen and Meckling’s agency cost model by firms, and the rise of free-market economics 
preached by Friedman (2013:2004-2005). 
In the early 1980s, Edward Freeman, a philosopher and professor at a leading business school 
in the US, formulated the stakeholder theory of the firm, for which he is generally credited 
(Schilling, 2000:225). Freeman and Reed (1983:89) described the stakeholder theory as a 
simple one in which the responsibility of the firm is to other groups in addition to shareholders. 
These groups were designated as stakeholders of the firm (1983:89). 
The development of this stakeholder theory of the firm was attributed to the need for a strategic 
management doctrine in the late 1970s (Freeman & Reed, 1983:90). It had become clear that 
there was a need for a doctrine that could account for non-traditional business problems arising 
from government, trade groups, overseas competitors, dissatisfied shareholders, the employee 
rights lobby, consumer rights, environment pollution, tariffs, regulations and equal 
opportunity. In 1977, this led the Applied Research Center at The Wharton School to assemble 
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the “stakeholder project” (1983:91). The aim of this project was to develop a theory of 
management which executives could use to formulate and implement a corporate strategy in 
turbulent environments (1983:91). 
Two decades later, Freeman (2004:229) stated that he conceived the stakeholder theory in the 
second half of the 1970s during his time at Stanford Research Institute. There, in conjunction 
with James Emhoff, he began working on the stakeholder concept for an executive education 
programme for Bell System, now AT&T. The work culminated in developing a one-week 
training module that included two papers, several cases and a stakeholder simulation that would 
be useful to managers.  
The origins of the stakeholder theory, as understood today, date back much earlier than the 
work done at The Wharton School or by Freeman at the Stanford Research Institute. Thus, in 
1918, the foundation of the stakeholder theory was laid out by Mary Parker Follet. In her 
publication in The New State, Follet stated the structure, management and the function of a 
business should be connected to the world around it and dependent on it (Schilling, 2000:224). 
She defined the new paradigm for organisations to pursue as being cooperation rather than 
competition. This would lead organisations, individuals and society to achieve greater 
effectiveness, more satisfied lives, and greater welfare (2000:224). The General Electric 
Company (now GE) had already identified the four main groups that it needed to deal with: 
shareholders, employees, customers, and the general public (Dodd, 1932:1156). 
In due course, various definitions of the term ‘stakeholders’ were developed and these include: 
(1) “groups and individuals, who can affect, or are affected by, the achievement of an 
organization’s mission” (Freeman, 1984:52); (2) “groups of constituents who have a legitimate 
claim on the firm through the existence of an exchange relationship” (Hill and Jones, 
1992:133); (3) “involved in explicit or implicit contracts with the firm” (Donaldson and 
Preston, 1995:80); (4) “groups and individuals who benefit from or are harmed by, and whose 
rights are violated or respected by, corporate actions” (Freeman, 2001:41); and (5) “those 
groups or individuals with whom an organization interacts or has interdependencies” (Carroll 
& Buchholtz, 2014:8). 
The stakeholders in the firm were then classified into two broad groups: either primary or 
secondary (Mitchell, Agle & Wood, 1997:853). Pairs were defined, such as “owners and non-
owners, resource providers and dependants, risk-takers or influencers, actors and those acted 
upon” (1997:854). Managers perceived any or all of the following attributes to be salient for 
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stakeholder identification: (1) the power a stakeholder has to influence the firm; (2) the 
legitimacy of the relationship between the stakeholder and the firm; and, (3) how urgent is the 
stakeholders claim in the firm (1997:854). 
Donaldson and Preston (1995:66-67) break down and then describe the stakeholder theory in 
terms of four distinct yet mutually supportive aspects: descriptive/empirical, instrumental, 
normative and managerial. (1) The descriptive aspect presents the firm as a collection of 
cooperative and competitive interests having intrinsic value. That provides a framework for 
any empirical testing. (2) The instrumental aspect founds the framework for examining the link 
between stakeholder management practices and the achievement of performance goals set by 
the firm. The suggestion here is that firms adopting the stakeholder approach to a business have 
relatively successful performance figures, all other things being equal. (3) The normative 
aspect involves accepting that stakeholders have a legitimate interest in the corporate activity 
of the firm and that these interests are of intrinsic value. (4) The managerial aspect constitutes 
what stakeholder management is, and recommends the attitudes, structure and practices of the 
firm.  
There is a substantial amount of discussion in the literature concerning the normative aspect of 
the stakeholder theory and how firms relate to their stakeholders and what managers ought to 
do. In contrast there are relatively few studies of the instrumental and descriptive/empirical 
aspects of the stakeholder theory (Berman, Wicks, Kotha & Jones, 1999:488). Using key 
stakeholders relationships including employees, environment, customers, community and 
diversity, Berman et al. (1999:489-490) used regression models to examine any link between 
managing stakeholder relationships, the firm strategy and its financial performance. Their 
empirical study involved the top 100 firms on the Fortune 500, for the period 1991 to 1996, 
and established that all these five stakeholder relationships had both direct and indirect effects 
on the firms’ performance (1999:500). In particular, employees and customers had a significant 
impact on financial performance of the firms investigated in the study (1999:501). 
An important strength of the stakeholder theory was that it was able to address three 
interconnected business problems related to value creation, business ethics and the managerial 
mind set (Parmar, Freeman, Harrison et al., 2010:405). The stakeholder theory was a set of 
ideas or a framework, which can be thought as being a genre of management theory rather than 
being seen as a specific theory with a single purpose (Parmar et al., 2010:406). The diverse 
nature of the perspectives of the various stakeholders allows it to function in range of settings 
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serving different purposes, being widely applied in disciplines such as environmental policy, 
ethics, healthcare, law and public administration (2010:406). 
Further endorsement for the stakeholder theory of a firm came from marketing guru Philip 
Kotler, who acknowledged that firms could not operate singularly, as self-capable units, 
without having dedicated partners. This was because firms were becoming increasingly 
dependent on their employees, suppliers, distributors and advertising agencies (Kotler, 
2005:119). 
The stakeholder theory presents itself as a moral argument to the effect that a firm had duties 
to others (Langtry, 1994:431; Gibson, 2000:248). One of the unresolved challenges it faces is 
a conceptual confusion over the extensive array of definitions of the term ‘stakeholders,’ 
leading some finance researchers to reject it altogether (Miles, 2012:285). This demonstrates 
that the stakeholder theory is an important element in a firm’s objective debate, but is not the 
conclusive element. 
2.4 The customer-oriented theory of the firm 
The turbulent times of the 1970s gave rise to another perspective on the objective of the firm. 
Management guru Peter Drucker disagreed with the shareholder-value views of the time, and 
he challenged and argued against the profit maximisation objective of a firm (Drucker, 
1974:46). He argued that a business entity cannot be defined or explained by profitability, and 
that the profit seeking nature of society was one of the most dangerous diseases in an industrial 
society (1974:46). 
This set the scene for Drucker (1974:47) to state that a firm had only one objective which was 
“to create a customer.” Only the customer of the firm was willing to pay for goods or services 
which converted economic resources into wealth, and materials into goods. Hence, the 
customer was the foundation of the business, keeping it in existence and by doing so, 
determined what a business was (1974:47).  
Drucker (1974:59) argued further that a business could not be defined by its name, buildings, 
or its articles of incorporation. On the contrary: a business was defined as an entity that exists 
to satisfy the wants of a customer whenever goods or services are purchased. The question of 
what a business is, could only be answered from the customers’ view point. Whatever the 
customer believed or wanted at any given time must be accepted by management as their 
objective (1974:59). The entire work force from engineers, salesmen to accountants should 
consciously make an effort to get answers from customers, rather than reading their minds. 
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Any serious attempt by a business to define what it was, needed to start with the customers, 
their realities, situation, behaviour, expectations and what they value (1974:60). 
However, not only Drucker shared the customer-oriented sentiment on the objective of a firm. 
Bell and Emory (1971:38) pointed out that earlier marketing textbooks noted that the primary 
function of a business was to satisfy customer needs. These texts also claimed that the success 
of any business could be measured by how well it served its customers, and if any operation 
were not in the interests of its customers, then it was not justifiable regardless of the profit it 
generated (1971:38). This doctrine was referred to as the marketing concept and its three pillars 
were: (1) consumer concern – consumer satisfaction to be the focus for all decisions; (2) 
integrated operations – consumer and social problems take precedence over all operations; and 
(3) profit reward – this is the residual result of ensuring consumer satisfaction for the business 
(1971:39).  
According to the marketing concept, the aim of the firm was to use all its efforts to satisfy the 
customer (McCarthy & Perreault Jr, 1984:35). Houston (1986:81-82) described this marketing 
concept as being identical to the customer-oriented approach. However the term ‘marketing 
concept’ did not refer to advertising, promoting or selling. Instead it referred to “a willingness 
to recognise and understand [the] consumer’s needs and wants,” and to examine how the 
marketing mix could be applied to satisfy these needs and wants (1986:86). 
A customer-oriented firm was one that believed in putting the interests of the customer first in 
order to develop a venture profitable in the long term while also considering the interests of its 
owners, management, and employees (Deshpandé, Farley & Webster Jr, 1993:27). In a study 
of Japanese firms on the Nikkei stock exchange, Deshpandé et al. (1993:30) established that 
there was a positive correlation between customer-orientation and business performance.  
Slater (1997:164) defines a customer-value based theory of the firm in which the organisation’s 
culture embraced customer values thereby leading to superior performance returns. Therefore, 
the objective of a firm was not to maximise profits or reduce transaction costs; on the contrary,  
firms existed to satisfy the needs of the buyers by providing them with goods and services 
which they could not provide themselves (1997:164). A firm could achieve superior 
performance as a result of providing superior customer value. This was evident from the 
examples of IBM and Compaq who were outstanding performers at one time; however their 
performance and market share eroded in the late 1980s and 1990s. Their performance only 
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improved when they developed a better understanding of their customers and delivered greater 
value to them (1997:164). 
The theory of the customer-oriented objective of a firm fills a gap in this debate. Satisfied 
customers generate long-term value for the business (Denning, 2012:14). After all, satisfied 
customers have more knowledge about the firm than shareholders, and have a longer-term 
commitment to the firm (Fox & Lorsch, 2012:57). The benefits arising from satisfied customers 
are passed on to shareholders and other stakeholders.  
2.5 Other theories on the objective of the firm 
The three theories on the objective of a firm, discussed above, all had their own individual 
shortcomings and they reflected totally diverging views. This situation gave an incentive to 
finance researchers to develop other theories on the objective of the firm, adding to the debate. 
Sternberg (1999:9) acknowledged that the stakeholder theory was being widely offered as a 
corrective to poor business ethics and corporate governance, but at the same time he sought to 
prove that the most popular usage of the stakeholder concept was hostile to the responsible 
conduct of business. He challenged the notion that organisations must be held accountable for 
all their stakeholders and should balance competing stakeholder interests (1999:10). He 
described the distinctive stakeholder doctrine as “fundamentally misguided,” claiming that it 
could not bring about improvements and was not capable of providing better corporate 
governance, business conduct, or performance (1999:10). The stakeholder theory undermined 
support for social and business responsibility, and was not compatible with business objectives 
(1999:10). 
Sternberg (1999:10) proposed a better model for business ethics and social responsibility, 
termed the ethical decision model. This model acknowledged the distinct roles of shareholders 
and the nature of the business, and looked to treat all stakeholders ethically. It provided a clear 
criterion for business to be ethically responsible while respecting the individual liberty and 
rights of business owners. According to Sternberg (1999:10) social responsibility was not a 
responsibility ‘to’ stakeholders as indicated by Freeman, but a responsibility ‘of’ stakeholders. 
The ethical decision model can improve business performance as it gives the firm a greater 
awareness of what important activities to pursue (1999:41). 
After having identified and established the agency theory two decades earlier, and being a 
strong advocate of shareholder-value maximisation, Jensen (2002:235) proposed enlightened 
value maximization as the new corporate objective for firms to pursue. This was an effort to 
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merge stakeholder theory as the base, and shareholder-value maximisation in the long term. In 
other words, Jensen (2002:235) proposed the retention of value seeking as the sole objective, 
while incorporating stakeholder views as well. This was a shareholder theory of a business that 
incorporated business ethics. This theory disregarded Friedman’s initial statement that a 
business had no social responsibility, which was the foundation on which the shareholder-value 
primacy was based.  
To support his new theory, Jensen (2002:236) stated that the value maximisation proposition 
was backed by more than two hundred years of research in the disciplines of economics and 
finance. In contrast, the popular and contending stakeholder theory had its roots in sociology, 
organisational behaviour, politics of special interests and managerial self-interests (2002:236). 
Jensen argued that the stakeholder theory was logically incomplete as a specification for the 
firm’s objective, and this was not accidental because it served the private interests of those who 
promoted it, including directors on corporate boards, managers as well as corporate outsiders 
(2002:236). 
Adopting the stakeholder theory as the firm objective politicises the business (Jensen, 
2002:237). Since managers are empowered to use the firm’s resources as they see fit, they 
become handicapped when trying to survive in the competitive corporate environment. 
Research conducted during two centuries showed that businesses which maximised the firm’s 
value also maximised social welfare (Jensen, 2002:239). 
Influenced by Jensen’s enlightened value maximization theory of a firm, Pichet (2011:354) 
proposed the enlightened shareholder theory of a firm. This theory aimed to differentiate 
between interests of the firm, and its shareholders, and was addressed to the board members. 
According to Pichet (2011:354), the pure stakeholder theory was fragile, as it did not provide 
an adequate definition of the stakeholder concept, while the pure shareholder theory had its 
limitations.  
It was virtually impossible to identify just who were stakeholders, with “almost too many to be 
counted,” and with stakeholders having conflicting and opposing interests to each other (Pichet, 
2011:356). There were limitations to the pure shareholder theory: one of these was the 
possibility of conflict arising between firm and shareholder interests, which the Board 
Members of the firm could face (2011:358). As a specific example, shareholders were 
interested in the short-term financial performance (2011:359) while in contrast, firms were 
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seeking long-term profitability and sustainable development to satisfy customers, employees 
and suppliers (2011:359). 
The enlightened shareholder value theory, however, integrated shareholder reasoning, useful 
elements from stakeholder theory and cognitive theory (Pichet, 2011:360). The enlightened 
shareholder mechanism was one in which the firm: (1) had internal mechanisms that ensured 
its shareholders were informed of the firm’s proper functioning; (2) enabled shareholders to 
control the firm through the Annual General Meeting and powers they delegate to Board of 
Directors; and, (3) the firm’s corporate strategy has long-term interests for the firm and is 
compliant with the existing laws (2011:361). 
The enlightened shareholder value theory gained further prominence when it was enshrined in 
the provisions of the United Kingdom’s Companies Act 2006 under section 172 (Williams, 
2012:360). This section imposed on directors a duty to promote the firm’s success for the 
benefits of all its members (2012:360). The provision in the Act required boards of directors to 
respect the following principles while executing their duties: (1) assess the consequences of 
long-term decisions they make; (2) note the interests of its employees; (3) foster business 
relationships with its suppliers, customer and other parties; (4) assess the impact of the firm’s 
operations on the environment and community; (5) ensure a desire for the firm to maintain a 
reputation for high standards of business conduct; and (6), act fairly towards members of the 
firm (2012:361). 
The ethical decision model, enlightened value maximization, and enlightened shareholder 
theory are some of the newer and competing theories proposed by finance researchers. These 
were developed because the existing theories on the firm’s objective showed shortcomings that 
are being challenged. The development of these newer theories is an indication that the firm 
objective debate is evolving, active and continuing.   
2.6 Criticism of the shareholder and stakeholder theories  
Much of the corporate governance debate on the objective of a firm has continued to focus on 
the shareholder and stakeholder theories with advocates on both sides (Keay, 2007:577). Both 
these theories have been criticised for a long time over a number of issues (2007:585,611).  
Shareholder theorists claimed that stockowners were entitled to certain rights and privileges 
which managers do not have, and held this fiduciary relationship to be sacred and special 
(Freeman, 2001:38). This assumption of managerial capitalism made by shareholder theorists 
was challenged by Freeman (2001:39), and replaced with the notion that managers bear 
15 
 
fiduciary duties to all stakeholder groups, and not just shareholders. Stakeholder groups 
included customers, community, employees, management, and shareholders. Those groups 
were not to be treated as a means to an end, as they have a stake in the firm, and must participate 
in determining its future direction (2001:39).  
Managerial capitalism dictated that since shareholders had no control despite ownership, their 
interests should be pursued vigorously (Freeman, 2001:39). However, changes in the law of 
corporations imposed constraints on the pursuit of shareholder interests and now required the 
claims of stakeholder groups to be taken into consideration (2001:40). The pursuit of 
managerial capitalism had led firms to develop anti-competitive behaviour, and in a number of 
industries had led to the formation of oligopolies and abuse of market power, which in turn led 
to regulation of management activities (Freeman, 2001:41).  
Disagreeing with Freeman, Hendry (2001:159) noted that the stakeholder concept had exerted 
a great influence on academic thinking while the normative stakeholder theory appeared to be 
“in a state disarray and confusion.” Despite being a dominating theme in business and corporate 
governance in the 1990s (2001:159), stakeholder theory proponents had undermined 
themselves as they could not engage proponents of the rival shareholder theory effectively. 
They either pitched their sights too high or too low (2001:160).   
Hendry (2001:160) then identified three questions and three different levels of claims of the 
stakeholder theory that undermined its position and sacrificed its credibility. The questions that 
the stakeholder theory did not sufficiently address were: (1) responsibilities in an ideal just 
society; (2) desirable changes to the laws and institutions; and, (3) responsibilities of managers 
within the existing law framework. 
Admitting that stakeholder literature addressed these questions to a limited degree, Hendry 
(2001:164) called for different kinds of answers and argued as follows. Firstly, in an ideal and 
just society based on Marxist theory there would not be joint stock firms. Value creation should 
not just be in stakeholders’ interest but in the interests of the society as a whole. Secondly, in 
an ideal society, modifications can be suggested to the law to deal with existing realities. 
Therefore, one should debate how much of the laws of corporations were to be accepted as they 
stand, what was open to change and how best the changes can be effected. Thirdly, stakeholder 
theorists have not been careful in their criticism of shareholder theory on the manager’s 
responsibilities, thus weakening their case.  
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Marcoux (2003:1) questioned the stakeholder theorists’ view that the fiduciary duties of 
management towards shareholders held no special moral status. By using a three-point 
argument Marcoux (2003:1) seeks to demonstrate that the manager-shareholders fiduciary 
relationship does indeed have a special moral status and that the stakeholder theory was morally 
inadequate in dismissing this. Marcoux argued as follows: (1) some elements of the relationship 
require fiduciary duties and, (2) that relationship possesses features that make fiduciary duties 
necessary for it to work (managers of the firm held in trust and have no conflict of interests 
with shareholder expectations) then, (3) stakeholder theory is morally lacking and is 
constrained by denying this fiduciary relationship. 
According to Marcoux (2003:2), the manager-stakeholder duties are not fiduciary duties owed 
morally, whereas the manager-shareholder duties are fiduciary duties owed morally. 
Stakeholder theorists fail to recognise that shareholders are owed fiduciary duties, and instead 
treat all stakeholder interests equally, despite shareholders having a legitimate claim upon 
managers.  
The reason why managers cannot be in a fiduciary relationship to all stakeholders is because it 
is conceptually impossible to place the interests of any one of the stakeholders, including 
shareholders, ahead of all the others (Marcoux, 2003:4). It is also practically impossible to 
serve, simultaneously, the interests of each of the stakeholders because of conflicting interests 
(2003:4). Managers have access to more information than shareholders, and more control, and 
this exposes shareholders to acute vulnerabilities and puts them at a disadvantage (2003:16). 
This makes it more important for managers to have a moral fiduciary relationship to the 
shareholders, and not just because of a matter of public policy (2003:16). Stakeholder theorists 
may deny the existence of any fiduciary duties to shareholders, yet some relationships are 
morally deep and independent of any social wellbeing that they may bring. The vulnerable 
manager-shareholder relationship is one of those (2003:19). 
The stakeholder movement and the ideology of shareholder-value maximisation have coexisted 
uneasily with each other for as long as the modern corporate has existed; however, the increase 
in prominence of the stakeholder view in organisational studies has been relatively recent 
(Sundaram & Inkpen, 2004a:352). The shareholder’s objective in relation to the firm was 
expressed as early as 1919, when the Michigan State Supreme Court in “Dodge vs. Ford Motor 
Company” ruled in favour of the minority shareholders; the Dodge brothers. The court ruled 
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that the function of the business was primarily for the profits of its shareholders, and stopped 
Ford from reinvesting its retained earnings (2004a:351).  
Sundaram and Inkpen, (2004a:354-356) put forward several arguments as to why stakeholder 
management was not a valid model for corporate governance. They argued that stakeholder 
management distorted entrepreneurial risk taking incentives (2004a:354). Thus, by managing 
all its stakeholders, the firm was at risk of missing out on investing in new opportunities to 
grow its business, such entering new markets, producing new products, and developing new 
cutting-edge technologies to remain innovative and give it a competitive edge (2004a:354).  
Their second argument was that if a firm pursues more than one objective, apart from 
shareholder-value maximisation, this would create a potential for confusion and uncertainty in 
decision making (Sundaram & Inkpen, 2004a:354). Since there were several classes of 
stakeholder groups whose objectives may be in conflict with each other, the question of which 
stakeholder groups really mattered remained unanswered (2004a:354). It was “wishful 
thinking” for management to create a complex hierarchy of stakeholder groups and then 
address these groups’ multiple objectives according to each group’s perceived importance 
(2004a:354).  
Their third argument was that stakeholder groups can become shareholders if they want to, but 
the reverse was not easy (Sundaram & Inkpen, 2004a:355). Stakeholder groups are concerned 
about potential abuses that may arise from pursuing shareholder-value maximisation, yet there 
was nothing to stop them from becoming shareholders (2004a:355). Bondholders are also 
stakeholders in the firm and may decide to buy the shares, fund managers managing the 
retirement pension for the local community may invest in the firm’s equity, and even 
employees are given share-ownership option plans (2004a:355).  
Finally, from a legal perspective, shareholders have implicit contracts with the firm entitling 
them to a residual claim on cash flows, whereas stakeholders have explicit contracts with the 
firm (Sundaram & Inkpen, 2004a:355). These contractual interests of various stakeholder 
groups such as customers, communities, employees and suppliers are protected by contract law 
and by regulations, with no recourse for shareholders (2004a:355). The gap in the legal system 
does not protect shareholders’ contractual interests and so the board members are required by 
law to have fiduciary duties to shareholders (2004a:356). 
Sundaram and Inkpen (2004a:359) voiced scepticism concerning the argument that the 
stakeholder approach leads firms to behave better or gain competitive advantage. While 
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acknowledging that stakeholders should not be ignored, shareholder-value management leads 
firms to make decisions that improve outcomes for multiple stakeholders. If management 
pursues fiduciary duties towards shareholders, then the moral and legal duties to stakeholders 
will also be fulfilled (2004a:359). 
In defence of the stakeholder theory, Freeman, Wicks and Parmar (2004:364) pointed out that 
firms such as AES, eBay, Google, and J&J developed and ran their businesses, consistently, 
using the stakeholder approach to “create outstanding business.” Yet none of these firms had 
adopted profitability as their objective, and saw stakeholder relationships as being critical for 
their ongoing success (2004:364). The stakeholder theory was pro-shareholder; thus, creating 
value for stakeholders would create value for shareholders as well. By following the tenets of 
the stakeholder theory such as producing goods and services that customers want to buy, 
offering attractive employment, building relationships with suppliers, and being good corporate 
citizens, shareholder value would be created in the process (2004:366).  
Shareholder theory proponents held the view that the stakeholder approach to a business 
discourages entrepreneurial risk-taking at the expense of shareholders, because of missed 
opportunity costs (Sundaram & Inkpen, 2004a:354). In reality, managers often work in 
conjunction with stakeholder groups such as customers and suppliers to test new products and 
services (Freeman et al., 2004:366). The inherent risk that comes with testing new ideas, 
programmes or products is often accepted by customers and suppliers (2004:366).  
Another criticism of a firm pursuing shareholder value as a singular objective is that this made 
management complex and governance difficult (Freeman et al., 2004:366). Managers are often 
faced with a great deal of complexity and uncertainty which require more judgement than ever 
before (2004:367). For example, a manager would not have a clear understanding of how 
setting up a new plant in one country would affect the operation of existing plants in another 
country. Would hiring a new HR director affect the firm’s share price and if so, how? 
(2004:367). However, if the multiple stakeholder interests are seen as interwoven, managers 
will be able to proceed in the right direction. If these relationships are well managed then 
shareholders too would reap the benefits (2004:367). Also, if managers pursued a singular 
objective by focussing on shareholders, this would give rise to the perception of not being 
morally responsible. Managers could also be led to rationalise questionable practices at the 
expense of stakeholders. As such, there was no moral ground for business to claim to be making 
money for the shareholders’ sake (2004:367). 
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A study by the consultancy firm Grant Thornton showed that the number of firms wanting to 
go public on stock exchanges in the US during the period 1997 to 2009 declined by a substantial 
52.8% adjusted for GDP growth. Instead, firms preferred to be sold through private equity deals 
(Weild & Kim, 2009:4). This was the result of an array of regulatory changes that firms had to 
comply with in order to go public (2009:4). Those changes came into effect as a response to  
the scandals at Enron and Worldcom, where management was obsessed with driving up share 
prices and consequently pursuing shareholder-value capitalism (Denning, 2013). 
A study of shareholder returns from investing in the S&P 500 showed that investors enjoyed 
CAGR of 7.5% between 1933 and 1976. After 1976 and until 2011, when Jensen and 
Meckling’s principal-agent theory was gaining popularity, CAGR returns on the S&P 500 
dropped to 6.5% (Martin, 2010:59). This showed that shareholder-value capitalism was 
actually destroying a firm’s value in the long run. Firms needed to refocus on customers and 
move away from preoccupation with shareholder value. If customers were taken care of, then 
shareholders would benefit too, although the reverse was simply not true (Martin, 2010:59). 
Perhaps Lynn Stout has been the strongest critic of firms pursuing shareholder wealth 
maximisation. In her book, Stout (2012:3) deconstructs the shareholder-value notion deeming 
it akin to mythology and then proving it to be one of the weakest ideologies of modern times. 
Stout (2012:19) points out that the pursuit of shareholder value had cemented itself in the last 
thirty years as “a simple, easy-to-understand” objective for firms which “also appealed to the 
popular press and the business media.” It was the collapse of Enron in 2001, caused by a 
massive accounting fraud and poor management, which finally led a number of leading 
scholars, researchers and experts to believe that shareholder value was at its pinnacle and 
declining (2012:23). 
At first, Stout (2012:24) demystifies the link between corporate law and shareholder primacy. 
While experts in various fields of law, finance, and management believed shareholder value to 
be the defacto objective, American corporate law did not explicitly endorse this statement and 
indeed, it was a fable (2012:25). On the contrary, American corporate law stipulates that 
management discharge its duties “in good faith and in the best interests of the corporation” 
(Clarke, 2013:17). This common-sense view was hijacked and replaced by a narrow and 
constricting shareholder-value approach (2013:17).  
Stout (2012:33) then moves on to demystify the link between corporate economics and 
shareholder primacy. This link was established by the economists Friedman, and Jensen and 
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Meckling, who endorsed it in the 1970s (2012:34). The first mistaken assumption that 
economists make is that shareholders own corporations; however, corporations are legal 
entities which have independent ownership. Stockholders only own shares of the firm and have 
limited rights, as is the case for bondholders, employees or suppliers (2012:37-38). The second 
mistaken assumption is that shareholders are the only residual claimants. This notion has its 
roots in bankruptcy law. However, in insolvency cases, courts have often placed creditors as 
residual claimants, which is the same status as shareholders and displaying similar rights 
(2012:38-41). The third mistaken assumption is that shareholders are principals, and the board 
of directors is their agent. However, the board of directors is incorporated when a firm is formed 
and has indirect influence through voting rights, with limited influence over a firm’s daily 
operations. In contrast to the board, shareholders cannot appoint the CEO, mandate dividend 
payments, stop the squandering of revenues by the management, or buy or sell assets. 
Therefore, shareholders who are considered to be principals of the firm have no direct impact 
or control over it, and directors of the firm who are agents are free to pursue charitable means 
which is in contrast to the shareholder-value interests (2012:42-44). 
After criticising the shareholder-value notion from the legal and economic perspectives, Stout 
(2012:47) examines how empirical evidence was lacking in its favour. Research on the issue 
of shareholder primacy yields few results to prove that it actually works. Indeed, various 
empirical studies of firms that adopted shareholder primacy reforms had confused and 
contradicting results (2012:49).  
Clarke (2013:16) criticised the tenets of Jensen and Meckling’s agency theory that had long 
been used to promulgate shareholder primacy. The tenets of agency theory were portrayed as 
eternal, universal, and unarguable, being misconstrued as an authentic legal justification on 
guiding directors in their duties. This incorrect interpretation often leads firms to pursue 
narrowing and damaging corporate objectives (2013:17). The agency theory was deeply flawed 
as it oversimplifies the complex decisions made in the real world, insists on a damaging single 
shareholder objective, ignores the fact that a firm has diverse interests, weakens firms and 
economies, and achieves the opposite of what it intended (2013:22). The international trend in 
which firms pursue CSR initiatives was a stark contradiction of shareholder theory, as those 
firms are perceived as more responsible by society, creating sustainable value for all (2013:34).  
21 
 
The criticism of the shareholder and stakeholder theories demonstrates that the debate on the 
objectives and accountability of a firm continues to be both important and controversial 
(Sundaram & Inkpen, 2004b:370).  
2.7 Research purpose 
The literature discussed in chapter two illustrates the existence of opposing and contrasting 
views of the firm’s objective. The shareholder, stakeholder and customer-oriented theories 
show historical depth.  
This literature review highlights that there is no clear consensus among finance researchers on 
the objective of a firm and the debate rages on. Therefore, much of the literature is inconclusive 
and indecisive on the objective of the firm.  
Against this background, this study sets out to determine how the shareholder, stakeholder, 
customer-oriented theories of the firm are reflected in financial textbooks, and in the Mission, 
Vision, and Values statements of the JSE TOP40 firms in a South African context.  
The study aims to answer the research question: 
Which of the three firm objective theories is reflected in financial textbooks commonly 





3. Research Approach 
 
3.1 Research question 
The aim of choosing the appropriate method for analysing the firm objective statements 
extracted from financial textbooks, and from the MVV statements of the JSE TOP40 firms is 
to be able to answer the following research question: 
Which of the three firm objective theories is reflected in financial textbooks commonly 
prescribed at South African business schools and in the MVV statements of the JSE TOP40 
firms? 
3.2 Data 
Both local and international editions of financial textbooks were used to collect data.  The 
recommended readings for the various finance courses offered by South African business 
schools were referred to in this study, as these list such textbooks.  
Popular corporate finance and financial management textbooks written by prominent authors 
were then selected, based on the following criteria: 
 A sample size of at least 20 textbooks. 
 Recommended by leading business schools as a course textbook. 
 Editions published no earlier than 2010, to accommodate any change in the author’s 
view following the events of the GFC. 
 Having a diverse geographic spread to reflect global opinion. 
For each of these selected textbooks, sentences and/or paragraphs defining the purpose of a 
firm were sought and collected. In most textbooks, this information was found in the first 
chapter. The data obtained from each financial textbook was saved in separate Microsoft Word 
files. 
An example of the objective of the firm, as described in one of the financial textbooks used in 





“The premise of this book is that the appropriate goal of the management of any corporation, 
including a multinational corporation, is to maximize shareholder wealth. The management 
of a corporation maximizes shareholder wealth by making investments in projects whose 
returns are sufficiently large to compensate its shareholders, through dividends and capital 
gains, for the risk involved in the projects.” 
Source: International Financial Management, Geert Bekaert and Robert Hodrick, 2012, 2e 
 
Table 1, below, highlights the distribution of financial textbook data used, sorted by title: 
Title Count Percentage 
Having "Corporate Finance" 8 40% 
Having "Financial Management"  10 50% 
Other 2 10% 
Total 20 100% 
Table 1 - Financial textbooks by title 
 
Table 2, below, highlights the distribution of financial textbook data used, sorted by country 
published: 
Published Count Percentage 
United States 12 60% 
United Kingdom 2 10% 
South Africa 4 20% 
Singapore 1 5% 
Netherlands 1 5% 
Total 20 100% 





Table 3, below, highlights the distribution of financial textbook data used, sorted by year: 
Year Count Percentage 
2015 2 10% 
2014 8 40% 
2013 2 10% 
2012 4 20% 
2011 3 15% 
2010 1 5% 
Total 20 100% 
Table 3 - Financial textbooks by year 
 
The JSE TOP40 firms are the forty largest companies on the stock exchange by market 
capitalisation. For the JSE TOP40 firms’ data, all the MVV statements were chosen as at 30th 
April 2015. 
With nearly 85% of total market capitalisation, the JSE TOP40 index gives a good 
representation of the whole stock exchange. 
Index Total Market Cap (R) Percentage 
TOP40           10,189,590,769,664.00  84.52% 
JALSH           12,055,713,041,408.00  100.00% 
Source: Bloomberg, 30-Apr-2015   
Table 4 - JSE total market capitalisation 
 
For each of the JSE TOP40 firms, their Mission, Vision, Values and Strategy statements were 
noted. These data were saved in separate Microsoft Word files in order to expedite a better 
analysis of each firm’s objective.  
 Mission – The purpose of the firm. Why it exists, what it wants to do best. 
 Vision – What the firm wishes to accomplish, or set, or reach a milestone. 
 Values – What the firm adheres to closely and feels strongly about. 
 Strategy – The plan the firm has developed towards achieving its goals. 
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The Strategy statement was used for those firms that did not have a Mission, Vision or Values 
statement. 
The JSE TOP40 firms were analysed further to identify any patterns regarding the firms’ 
objectives. The MSCI- and S&P-developed GICS Sector grouping were used for this analysis. 
The firms were examined on a Sector basis to determine whether there was any observable 
preference for either a shareholder, stakeholder or customer-oriented objective within that 
specific Sector. 
An example of a Mission statement of one of the JSE TOP firms: 
“Our core purpose at Discovery is to enhance and protect people’s lives and with that comes 
a responsibility to act to the benefit of our society as a whole.” 
Source: Discovery Ltd 
 
An example of a Vision statement from one of the JSE TOP40 firms: 
“To lead the delivery of a bold, new Digital World to our customers.” 
Source: MTN Group Ltd 
 







The MVV statements for each of the JSE TOP40 firms were obtained from various sources 
including their corporate websites, integrated reports, and sustainability reports. This approach 
was similar to the one adopted by Morison and Ramsay (2014:441) in their analysis of the top 
100 firms listed on the ASX. 





  JSE TOP40 Website Financial Report Sustainability Report Other 
1 Anglo American PLC √ √ √  
2 Anglo American Platinum Ltd √ √   
3 AngloGold Ashanti Ltd √ √ √  
4 Aspen Pharmacare Holdings Ltd  √ √ √ 
5 Barclays Africa Group Ltd √ √  √ 
6 BHP Billiton PLC √ √ √  
7 British American Tobacco PLC √ √   
8 Bidvest Group Ltd √ √   
9 Capital & Counties Properties PLC √ √   
10 Cie Financière Richemont SA √   √ 
11 Discovery Ltd √  √  
12 FirstRand Ltd √ √   
13 Growthpoint Properties Ltd √ √   
14 Impala Platinum Holdings Ltd √ √ √  
15 Investec Ltd √ √ √ √ 
16 Imperial Holdings Ltd √ √   
17 Intu Properties PLC √    
18 Kumba Iron Ore Ltd √ √ √  
19 Life Healthcare Group Holdings Ltd √ √   
20 Mediclinic International Ltd √ √   
21 Mondi Ltd √ √ √  
22 Mr Price Group Ltd √ √   
23 MTN Group Ltd √ √ √  
24 Nedbank Group Ltd √ √   
25 Naspers Ltd √ √   
26 Netcare Ltd √ √   
27 Old Mutual PLC √ √   
28 Reinet Investments SCA √ √   
29 Remgro Ltd √ √ √  
30 RMB Holdings Ltd  √   
31 Rand Merchant Insurance Holdings Ltd  √   
32 SABMiller PLC  √   
33 Standard Bank Group Ltd  √ √  
34 Steinhoff International Holdings Ltd √ √   
35 Shoprite Holdings Ltd √ √   
36 Sanlam Ltd √ √ √  
37 Sasol Ltd √ √ √  
38 Tiger Brands Ltd √ √   
39 Vodacom Group Ltd √ √   
40 Woolworths Holdings Ltd/SA √ √ √  
  Count 35 37 15 4 
Table 5 - Data sources for JSE TOP40 MVV statements 
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The category “other” in Table 5 included sources such as corporate brochures, profiles, interim 
results and CSR reports. 
Some data limitations were encountered. For example, some firms either did not have or did 
not state their Mission, Vision or Values statements. In these instances, the firm’s Strategy 
statement was used for analysis purposes, in conjunction with any remaining MVV statements 
for that firm. This approach was intended to obtain as much information as possible to ascertain 
the objective pursued by the particular firm. 
Of the JSE TOP40 firms, Bidvest Group Ltd, and Imperial Holdings Ltd did not have either a 
mission or a vision statement. The firms confirmed this by email and indicated they did not 
make such statements because of the diverse nature of their businesses. Therefore, these two 
organisations were analysed using their value and strategy statements. 
3.3 Method 
The research data collected from both the financial textbooks and from the JSE TOP40 firms 
is largely descriptive in nature and of varied context. Given this large set of textual data sets 
that needed to be analysed, a qualitative analysis approach was deemed best as it provided for 
astute pattern recognition (Patton, 1999:1191). It is accepted that qualitative analysis methods 
aid in distinctively identifying patterns in variables, and this helps in describing data in order 
to obtain meaningful explanations (Sofaer, 1999:1102). This study therefore adopted 
qualitative analysis as the appropriate method.  
NVivo is used as the qualitative analysis software in this study. Computer assisted qualitative 
analysis using NVivo aids in searching for an accurate and transparent picture of the data, while 
providing an audit trail of the data analysis processes used (Welsh, 2002:1). Nvivo is relatively 
simple to use, and allows documents containing data to be imported directly into the software 
and viewed on screen (Welsh, 2002:3). 
The practical benefit of using NVivo was that it was developed by researchers using extensive 
feedback (Bazeley & Jackson, 2013:2). This software supports researchers in various ways by 
helping to manage data, manage ideas, query data, visualise data and generate reports (Bazeley 
& Jackson, 2013:3). Nvivo 10 was used as the appropriate qualitative analysis tool for this 
research. 
Nvivo enables qualitative analysis by gathering input data or material under themes which are 
termed ‘coding,’ and it stores this information in containers termed ‘nodes.’ In order to conduct 
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a meaningful qualitative analysis, the data from the financial textbooks and JSE TOP40 firms 
first had to be coded and placed into nodes. This data organisation process is the initial step of 
analysis in qualitative research (Miller, 2000:54). By coding tagged text, themes could later be 
identified in the text, and it could be indexed, to facilitate later retrieval (Bazeley & Jackson, 
2013:3). After this process, the findings can be visualised by running queries and generating 
reports.  
The three themes for which the data sets obtained from financial textbook and JSE TOP40 
firms would be analysed were: shareholder objective, stakeholder objective and customer-
oriented objective of the firm.   
The data from the twenty financial textbooks were saved in twenty Word files, and data from 
the MVV statements of the JSE TOP40 firms were saved in forty Word files; these were duly 
imported into NVivo. 
Six nodes were created, of which three were for analysing the firm objective as described in 
financial textbooks falling under each theme, and three for analysing the firm objective pursued 
by JSE TOP40 firms falling under each theme. As a result, coded data could be categorised 
under its respective node, in order to determine precisely what financial textbooks advocate 
and also what JSE TOP40 firms pursue as their firm objective. 
The nodes created for each of the six categories were: (1) Textbooks - shareholder objective; 
(2) Textbooks - stakeholder objective; (3) Textbooks - customer objective, (4) TOP40 - 
shareholder objective; (5) TOP40 - stakeholder objective; and, (6) TOP40 - customer objective. 
Two qualitative analysis techniques were used in NVivo to analyse data from the financial 
textbooks and JSE TOP40 firms: these were the word frequency and coding queries.  At first, 
the data sets were subjected to a word frequency query analysis and the findings tabulated; this 
was followed by a coding query analysis, after which the findings were visualised. 
In a word frequency query, the system analyses all data sets automatically and produces a list 
of most-frequently found words based on their count and weighted percentage. This helps to 
identify words which are prominent in the data sets, and the results then can be used to assess 
which firm objective theme was dominant in the findings, in respect of the financial textbooks 
and JSE TOP40 firms.  
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In a coding query, data are coded using user-defined parameters and are placed to nodes to 
analyse the data sets. These parameters are phrases selected by the user by going through the 
text and manually coding respectively in NVivo. 
The difference between the word frequency and coding queries is that the former ascertains the 
coverage of each firm objective in the data sets with reference to the weighted distribution of 
keywords, while the latter precisely identifies what each financial textbook advocates as the 
objective of the firm, and what each JSE TOP40 firm pursues as its objective. 
This dual analysis approach, using the same data sets, was applied to ensure verification and 
integrity of the findings. The reasoning was that in the analysis of the data from the financial 
textbooks and JSE TOP40 firms, in NVivo, the findings of both the word frequency and coding 
queries would match or closely mirror each other. 
In the word frequency query in NVivo, data from financial textbooks and JSE TOP40 firms, 
containing references to shareholder, stakeholder or customer-oriented objective of the firm, 
were analysed using the parameters set in Table 6. 
Objective Keywords 
Shareholder shareholder, generating profit, wealth maximisation, 
capital growth, enriching investor, value maximisation, 
shareholder value, income, share price, profit 
maximisation. 
Stakeholder stakeholder, employee, supplier, buyer, communities, 
society, admired, partners, environment. 
Customer-oriented customer, consumer, best firm, service, innovation, market 
leader, quality, specialist, excellence.  
Table 6 - Word frequency query keywords by firm objective 
 
The word frequency query searched all data and compiled a list of most-frequently used words, 
based on weighted percentage. This was done to complement the findings of the coding query 
and to ascertain the coverage of keywords by each objective represented in data from financial 
textbooks and JSE TOP40 firms. Two word frequency queries were created to analyse data sets 
from both the financial textbooks and JSE TOP40.  
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The word matching tolerance level was set at ‘75% to exact’ to find words similar to the 
keywords. This tolerance ensures that similar words such as shareholder and shareholders are 
counted. The word frequency search count was set at 100 words, from a default setting of 1000 
words. The top 100 words in terms of frequency were duly identified and their weighted 
percentage calculated; afterwards, the keywords falling under each objective were identified, 
grouped together and their weightage summed.  
Thus, for the top 100 words in terms of frequency, the keywords that adhere to a shareholder 
theory of a firm are lumped together and summed to arrive at the total weighted percentage. 
This is similarly repeated for keywords that adhere to stakeholder theory and customer-oriented 
theory respectively. To produce the total coverage of each firm objective as found in financial 
textbooks and in the JSE TOP40 firms.  
In the coding query, data from the financial textbooks and JSE TOP40 firms, containing 
references to shareholder, stakeholder, or customer-oriented objective of the firm, were coded 
under their respective nodes using the parameters set in Table 7. 
Objective  Phrases  
Shareholder Containing explicit mention of increasing shareholder 
wealth, or pursuing value maximisation. 
Stakeholder Containing explicit mention of pursuing stakeholders’ 
interests. 
Customer-oriented Containing explicit mention of being customer- or 
consumer- oriented, providing best service, or being a leader 
in its class. 
Table 7 - Coding query phrases by firm objective 
 
The user performed the coding process by manually selecting text referring to a shareholder, 
stakeholder or customer-oriented objective of the firm and then placing this text in its 
respective node.  
The following example illustrates the coding of the shareholder objective in financial textbook 
data. The highlighted text was coded to the node Textbooks – shareholder objective: 
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“Those who manage the activities of the firm are responsible for generating income for those 
that own the firm. Thus, there is no chance for a disconnect between benefits and those who 
benefit.” 
Source: Applied Corporate Finance, Mark Pyles, 2014 
 
The example, below, illustrates the coding of the stakeholder objective in the JSE TOP40 firm 
data. The highlighted text was coded to the node TOP40 – stakeholder objective: 
“To be the leading South African property company, consistently delivering superior value 
to all stakeholders, driven by our passion for property and our commitment to our core 
values.” 
Source: Growthpoint Properties Ltd 
 
The following example illustrates the coding of the customer-oriented objective in the JSE 
TOP40 firm data. The highlighted text was coded to the node TOP40 – customer objective: 
“We have a clear mission, to create the best shopping centre experience possible for our 
customers.” 
Source: Intu Properties PLC 
 
Coding query reports were generated for all six nodes, and were visualised and exported using 
the procedures described above. The visualised coding findings, by node, show whether each 
financial textbook or JSE TOP40 firm advocated or pursued the shareholder, stakeholder or 
customer-objective theory of a firm.  
In some instances, the description in the financial textbooks and the JSE TOP40 firms’ 
documentation was unclear and needed clarification in order to interpret the objective of the 
firm. In those instances the following guidelines were used to obtain clarity: 
If a financial textbook or a JSE TOP40 firm described the firm objective as being to serve its 
shareholders and stakeholders then this statement was considered to pursue a stakeholder 
theory of the firm, as it encompasses shareholders. 
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If a financial textbook or a JSE TOP40 firm described the firm objective as being to serve its 
customers and stakeholders then this statement was considered to pursue a stakeholder theory 
of the firm, as it encompasses customers. 
If a financial textbook or a JSE TOP40 firm described the firm objective as being to serve its 
shareholders, stakeholders, and customers then this statement was considered to pursue a 








4.1 Financial textbooks  
The word frequency query analysed the count and weightage of the most-frequently used and 
relevant words, found in the financial textbooks data. The top 100 words for the financial 
textbooks data is given in Appendix A. Those top 100 words were then filtered by selecting 
and organising the keywords in terms of the firm objective (see Table 6). 
The count and weighted percentage of these filtered keywords, grouped by firm objective for 
financial textbooks, are tabulated below: 
Shareholder objective Stakeholder objective Customer-oriented objective 
Keywords Count 
Weighted 
(%) Keywords Count 
Weighted 
(%) Keywords Count 
Weighted 
(%) 
maximize 19 11.45 stakeholders 2 1.2 better 2 1.2 
wealth 19 11.44      best 1 0.6 
shareholder 18 10.84           
value 15 9.04           
share 7 4.22           
owners 5 3.01           
stockholder 5 3.01           
investors 4 2.41           
price 3 1.81           
profit 2 1.2           
stock 2 1.2           
income 1 0.6           
rich 1 0.6           
Total %   60.83     1.2     1.8 
Table 8 - Word frequency keywords grouped by objective for financial textbooks data 
 
The findings presented in Table 8 indicate that the weighted keywords applicable to the 
shareholder objective sum at 60.83%: this finding shows that the shareholder objective 
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dominates the financial textbooks.  The weighted keywords for the stakeholder objective sum 
at 1.2%, while the weighted keywords for the customer-oriented objective sum at 1.8%.  
The coding query identified which financial textbooks advocated for a shareholder, 
stakeholder, or customer-oriented objective of the firm. This became apparent by visualising 
the coding query report by node: thus, each coding report by node listed the financial textbooks 
that fell under that specific node. The coding query finding for all financial textbooks data is 
given in Appendix B. 
The following financial textbooks were found to advocate for a shareholder objective of the 
firm, as visualised in NVivo: 
 
Figure 1 - Financial textbooks finding by shareholder objective 
 
Financial textbooks: Shapiro, 2014, 2e and Chang 2015 were found to advocate for a 
stakeholder objective of the firm. Whereas, textbook: Fouche 2014 was found to advocate for 
a customer-oriented objective of the firm. 
 




Figure 2 - The firm objective in financial textbooks 
 
Using the coding query, the overall finding in respect of financial textbooks was that seventeen 
financial textbooks (85%) advocated for a shareholder objective, two (10%) advocated for a 
stakeholder objective, and one (5%) advocated for a customer-oriented objective of the firm. 
Therefore, both the word frequency and coding and queries analysis of the financial textbooks 
data shows that a large majority of those textbooks advocate for the shareholder objective as 
being the primary objective of the firm.  Only two advocated the stakeholder objective and 
only one the customer-oriented objective. 
4.2 JSE TOP40 firms 
An analysis was conducted in which the first step was to determine the frequency and 
weightage of keywords pertaining to the shareholder, stakeholder, and customer-oriented 
objectives of the JSE TOP40 firms, as reflected in their MVV statements. The findings for the 
top 100 words in respect of those JSE TOP40 firms are listed in Appendix C.  
When those top 100 words had been identified from the JSE TOP40 firms’ data, they were 
filtered by selecting and organising the keywords in terms of the firm objective (see Table 6). 
The most frequent word was found to be ‘value’ with a count of 20, but this was omitted from 
the filtered word query finding for the JSE TOP40 firms; the reason was that the term ‘value’ 
is ambiguous on its own, and can refer to instances of either creating value for shareholders, 













The count and weighted percentage of these filtered keywords, grouped by objective for the 
JSE TOP40 firms, are tabulated below: 
Shareholder objective Stakeholder objective Customer-oriented objective 
Keywords Count 
Weighted 
(%) Keywords Count 
Weighted 
(%) Keywords Count 
Weighted 
(%) 
shareholders 14 4.83 stakeholders 15 5.17 customers 11 3.79 
returns 5 1.72 sustainable 4 1.38 best 7 2.41 
superior 5 1.72 brands 3 1.03 client 4 1.38 
capital 2 0.69 communities 3 1.03 consumer 4 1.38 
investing 2 0.69 admired 2 0.69 experience 4 1.38 
wealth 2 0.69 employees 2 0.69 leader 3 1.03 
investors 1 0.34 partners 2 0.69 leading 3 1.03 
   society 2 0.69 quality 2 0.69 
      colleagues 1 0.34 service 2 0.69 
      environments 1 0.34 excellence 1 0.34 
Total %   10.68     12.05     14.12 
Table 9 - Word frequency keywords grouped by objective for JSE TOP40 firms’ data 
 
The sum of the weighted percentage of keywords, grouped by objective and using the word 
frequency query, indicates that the shareholder, stakeholder and customer-oriented objectives 
for the JSE TOP40 firms are 10.68%, 12.05%, and 14.12% respectively.  
The coding query then was applied to identify which of the JSE TOP40 firms pursued a 
shareholder, stakeholder, or customer-oriented objective of the firm. Thus, the coding reports 
were visualised by node and those coding reports listed those JSE TOP40 firms that fell under 
its node. The coding query finding in respect of the data for all JSE TOP40 firms is given in 
Appendix D. 
The following JSE TOP40 firms were found to pursue a shareholder objective of the firm, as 




Figure 3 - JSE TOP40 firms finding by shareholder objective 
The following JSE TOP40 firms were found to pursue a stakeholder objective of the firm, as 
visualised in NVivo: 
 
Figure 4 - JSE TOP40 firms finding by stakeholder objective 
38 
 
The following JSE TOP40 firms were found to pursue a customer-oriented objective of the 
firm, as visualised in NVivo: 
 
Figure 5 - JSE TOP40 firms finding by customer-oriented objective 
 
A graphical representation of the findings in respect of the JSE TOP40 firms is presented 
below: 
 













Applying the coding query to the JSE TOP40 firms showed that eleven firms (28%) pursue the 
shareholder objective, seventeen firms (42%) pursue the stakeholder objective, and twelve 
firms (30%) pursue a customer-oriented objective. 
This finding shows that no single firm objective theory is dominant, although it should perhaps 
be noted that nearly half of the firms pursue a stakeholder objective. Thus, the shareholder, 
stakeholder, and customer-oriented objectives are well-represented across the JSE TOP40 
index.  
The findings of both the word frequency and coding queries indicate that the firm objective 
debate is evenly represented in the JSE TOP40. It should be noted that in the word frequency 
query, the shareholder, stakeholder and customer-oriented objectives were equally represented; 
however, in the coding query the stakeholder objective was more prominent. This was because 
keywords alone in context cannot define an objective of the firm; in contrast the word 
frequency query finding mimics closely the coding query finding for JSE TOP40 firms.  
The JSE TOP40 firm findings were then categorised in terms of their GICS Sector. The aim 
was to determine whether all or most firms in a particular sector, have any observable 
preference towards a shareholder, stakeholder or customer-oriented objective of the firm. The 
findings of the JSE TOP40 firms’ objective by sector are given in Appendix E.  
In this Sector analysis, the Energy and Industrial sectors were excluded as they had one firm 
each in the sample. It was found that firms in the Consumer Staples, Health Care, and Materials 
sectors showed no preference towards a particular objective. 
However, firms in the Financials sector lean heavily towards pursuing a shareholder objective. 
In the Consumer Discretionary sector, firms show preference for a stakeholder objective while 
in the Telecommunication Services sector, firms pursued a customer-oriented objective. 
4.3 Summary 
In the case of the data retrieved from financial textbooks, the coding query finding was that out 
of the twenty textbooks in the sample, seventeen advocated for a shareholder objective (85%), 
two advocated for a stakeholder objective (10%), and only one for a customer-oriented 
objective (5%) of the firm. This was supported by the finding from the word frequency query 
that indicated that the shareholder objective had a 60.8% representation; in contrast the 
stakeholder and customer-oriented objectives had very much smaller representation at 1.2% 
and 1.8% respectively.  
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In the case of data pertaining to the JSE TOP40 firms, the coding query finding found that 
seventeen firms pursued a stakeholder objective (42%), twelve firms pursued a customer-
oriented objective (30%), and eleven firms pursued a shareholder objective (28%). This was 
supported by the finding from the word frequency query; here the shareholder, stakeholder and 
customer-oriented objectives were found to have equal representation at 10.68%, 12.05%, and 
14.12% respectively. 
The analysis of the JSE TOP40 firms by sector showed that for most sectors, no identifiable 
preference was evident for a shareholder, stakeholder or customer-oriented objective. This lack 
of preference was because the firms within a particular sector all pursued different objectives. 
As indicated above, the Energy and Industrial sectors were excluded as they had one firm each 
in the sample. 
However, some sectors did indicate an identifiable preference. Thus, the Financials sector firms 
lean heavily towards a shareholder objective, while the Consumer Discretionary sector firms 
show preference for pursuing a stakeholder objective, while the Telecommunication Services 






In order to answer the research question, it should first be noted that the firm objective debate 
is better reflected in the MVV statements of the JSE TOP40 firms, than in financial textbooks. 
Thus, the analysis of data obtained from the financial textbooks indicated that the shareholder 
objective is the primary one for the firm. 
The literature review indicates that financial researchers have contributed to a wide body of 
knowledge on the different theories on the objective of a firm. That review showed the diversity 
of the debate on firm objectives; however this diversity does not fully reflect in the findings 
from the financial textbooks analysis although it does for the JSE TOP40 firms. 
Thus, the findings of the financial textbooks analysis presented a dominant support for the 
shareholder theory with very little endorsement of the stakeholders and customer-oriented 
objectives of the firm. The financial textbooks also did not discuss or validate why the 
shareholder objective was appropriate for firms to pursue, nor they did make any reference to 
any financial research to back this claim. In fact, financial textbooks contained little or no 
original reference to research views (Norgaard, 1981:34). They have placed the shareholder 
objective notion of the firm as given, for students to accept. 
Only two financial textbooks in the sample make a reference to a stakeholder objective of the 
firm, and only one refers to a customer-oriented objective of the firm. The remaining seventeen 
financial textbooks advocated for a shareholder objective. This highlights the gap that financial 
textbooks need to bridge, in order to make an instructive discussion on the objective of the 
firm; the textbooks also need to present the historical as well as the newer theories. The merits 
and demerits of each view of the firm should be presented for the students’ benefit, to enable 
them to think broadly. This broad overview would have made students aware that the objective 
of a firm is the focus of an ongoing, evolving debate. They would be better equipped during 
the transition from the business school environment to the corporate world. However, the 
textbooks do not do so, and so the students face a knowledge gap. 
The great emphasis on advocating the shareholder objective in financial textbooks shows a 
disconnection from corporate practices in two ways: (1) financial textbooks dominantly present 
shareholder value as the firm objective, whereas JSE TOP40 firms equally embrace the 
shareholder, stakeholder, and customer-oriented objectives and, (2) in contrast to the findings 
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from the financial textbooks, the shareholder objective was least pursued in the JSE TOP40 
firms. 
The financial textbooks in the data sample were published across the globe and recent editions. 
Yet the logic of shareholder-value maximisation was taken to be so obvious in the field of 
finance, that textbooks just asserted it without providing supporting arguments (Sundaram & 
Inkpen, 2004a:350). Any deviation from this objective was seen as an agency problem where 
there was a failure to separate ownership and control in the firm (2004:350). The purpose of 
the firm to pursue the shareholder-value maximisation objective was usually used as one of the 
ground rules for teaching in business schools (Fontrodona & Sison, 2006:39). Students were 
taught that managers and employees need to be incentivised appropriately to be in line with the 
firm’s goal of implementing the agency theory (2006:39).  
A study was conducted by Ferguson, Collison, Power and Stevenson (2005:27) to analyse the 
content of 21 introductory textbooks covering the disciplines of financial accounting, 
managerial accounting, and financial management prescribed by twelve degree-granting 
institutes in Scotland. The study found that accounting education gave priority to the interests 
of shareholders, and neglected the interests of stakeholder groups in a firm. Shareholder 
objective sentiments were echoed in a similar analysis of thirteen introductory management 
accounting textbooks in New Zealand (2005:29).  
This background indicates that students learning from the prescribed textbooks consider 
accounting decisions that lead to shareholder wealth maximisation to be appropriate; by doing 
so, they are being deprived of a broader vision to take into account various ethical 
considerations (Ferguson et al., 2005:41). Accounting educators need to resist this singular 
view presented by most accounting textbooks and should provide students alternative 
perspectives (2005:42). Since the fields of accounting and finance are intertwined, the 
shareholder objective views endorsed by financial and managerial accounting textbooks can 
reasonably be expected to be found in financial textbooks as well. 
In contrast, the dynamics of the firm objective debate reflecting in JSE TOP40 firms are quite 
different from the situation in financial textbooks. For instance, the shareholder objective was 
found to be the least pursued by firms on the JSE TOP40 index and this can be attributed to 
both international and domestic factors. 
Thus, the 2007-2008 GFC brought widespread mortgage defaults and had a critical impact on 
the US economy with a contagion effect being felt on economies around the world. A 
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favourable climate of weak monetary policies and low interest rates encouraged commercial 
banks and credit institutions to start lending money to subprime (riskier) borrowers (Obstfeld 
& Rogoff, 2009:25). These mortgages were collateralised and were sold to large financial 
institutions that accumulated huge holdings. Rising interest rates, and declining home prices 
due to excess supply, led to immense defaults by the subprime borrowers (2009:26). Lenders 
now held mortgage assets at a lower value than that acquired and could not dispose of them 
without incurring huge losses (2009:26).  
The aftermath of the GFC resulted in the collapse of several notable firms, with Lehman 
Brothers and Northern Rock filing for bankruptcy. Prominent banks such as BNP Paribas, 
Barclays, UBS and RBS all wrote-off billions of dollars in losses from investments in 
collateralised subprime instruments (Crotty, 2009:568). Firms such as Bear Sterns, HBOS and 
Merrill Lynch were acquired by other institutions, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were put under 
US government control, while AIG and Citigroup were bailed out (2009:569).  
The myth that firms were deemed too big to fail was shattered during the crisis. One of the 
findings regarding the root cause of the crisis was that shareholders put firms under sustained 
pressure to be highly aggressive and to focus on short-term profits (Avgouleas, 2009:43). This 
suggested that these firms were pursuing narrow shareholder interests which caused the global 
credit crunch. The consequence of this was that it led to major initiatives across the globe to 
undertake financial regulation reforms with far reaching effects on the future of global finance 
(Arner, 2009:92). The unfolding events in the US had a contagion effect on global economies 
including South Africa, with the JSE being significantly impacted as a result of the GFC 
(Majapa & Gossel, 2016:36).  
Vast majority of the managers of the firms that went insolvent during the GFC and other Wall 
Street executives were influenced by business schools teaching that profit seeking was the 
ultimate objective for an individual and the firm (Giacalone & Wargo, 2009:149). This was 
influenced by Friedman’s liberalism view which colonized the management-related discipline 
for over half a century, and mediated by University of Chicago (2009:150). The global financial 
meltdown was brought about “infact almost exclusively” by graduates from elite business 
schools who engineered Collateralized Debt Obligations (2009:159). 
In the wake of the GFC, finance curricula was criticized for ignoring the ethics of human 
behaviour (Copp, 2012:41). Most finance textbooks and curricula had not addressed these 
developments for student benefit and would take a further eight years to catch up (2012:44). 
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Erkens, Hung and Matos (2012:389) conducted a study to provide empirical evidence on how 
corporate governance influenced the financial performance of firms during the GFC; they 
investigated 296 of the largest financial firms in the world spread across 30 countries. The 
findings of the study were: (1) firms with a relatively high institutional ownership took on more 
risk before the crisis and experienced larger shareholder losses during the period, and (2) firms 
with boards independent from the management were able to raise equity during the crisis, 
causing wealth to be transferred from shareholders to debtholders. Prior to the crisis, 
institutional shareholders and independent directors encouraged management to take on greater 
risk to increase shareholder returns, and did not factor-in the risks and costs of financial 
catastrophes (2012:340). 
On the domestic front, in a post-apartheid South Africa, companies faced considerable pressure 
to address the income inequalities in society. This led the government to implement domestic 
policies such as Black Economic Empowerment which put pressure on firms to adhere to them 
(Gstraunthaler, 2010:146). Employment equity became a big issue for South African firms to 
focus on. Firms also had the burden of contributing to an equitable society through corporate 
governance measures, as this was seen as a tool to address social inequalities and enhance the 
legitimacy of business. Trade unions and their federations such as COSATU were not in favour 
of a strong focus on shareholders, and lobbied instead for more social distribution of wealth in 
society (2010:147). In the new South Africa, firms came under scrutiny for not doing enough 
to contribute towards the political goal of distribution of wealth in the country (2010:152). In 
South Africa, the pursuit of shareholder wealth maximisation appeared inconsistent with the 
nation’s commitment to ensure that firms were part of a civil society (Sarra, 2004:21). 
If we now turn to the discussion of the stakeholder objective, the results of this study showed 
a significant preference for this objective by firms on the JSE TOP40 index. This can be 
attributed to several domestic factors. 
Thus, the regulatory authorities such as the Reserve Bank, the Registrar of Banks, the Financial 
Services Board, and the Registrar of Companies exercised control over firms, oversaw their 
corporate governance, and exercised the most important function of the “protection of the 
public and other stakeholders” (Rossouw, van der Watt & Malan, 2002:294). 
In 1992, the King Committee was formed in order to recommend ways to strengthen the 
corporate governance of South African firms. In 1992, 2002 and 2009 the Committee published 
good corporate governance practices as guidance for the board of directors (Firer, Ross, 
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Westerfield & Jordan, 2012:11). These reports have come to be known as King I, II, and III. 
The evolution of these reports over time has helped to cement the alignment of both 
shareholders’ and stakeholders’ interests.  
Rossouw et al. (2002:296) described the King Report as the most definitive document on 
corporate governance in South Africa. The main objective of the King Report was to promote 
the highest standard and an integrated approach to corporate governance in the interest of a 
wide range of stakeholders (Vaughn & Ryan, 2006:506). 
The 1992, King I report recommended that a wider range of stakeholder interests should be 
considered by a firm as these relate to the fundamentals of good financial, social, ethical and 
environmental practices. The report noted that a firm cannot act independently from the broader 
society (Firer et al., 2012:12). 
The 2002, King II report introduced firms to the concept of corporate citizenship, and examined 
the corporate governance function with respect to the effect of a company’s actions on people, 
the planet and profits. Some of these recommendations were incorporated into the Companies 
Act 71 of 2008, as requirements for companies to be listed on the JSE. Both of these outcomes 
were significant achievements (Firer et al., 2012:12).  
The 2012, King III report emphasised the need for firms to have an integrated sustainability 
report apart from the normal financial reporting aimed at all business entities. This was a 
voluntary recommendation with no statuary obligations on a firm to comply. It stipulated the 
responsibility of the board to foster ethical corporate structure for its long-term viability (Firer 
et al., 2012:12). 
JSE regulations also made it mandatory for all listed firms to include reports on their social, 
environmental, and economic performance in addition to the financial and sustainability reports 
(Firer et al., 2012:12). The stipulations of King III and broadening reporting requirements for 
firms is an affirmation of the importance in South Africa of the transition of firms from the 
shareholder to stakeholder maximisation objective. 
The various strikes in the mining sector in South Africa brought forward the plight and 
importance of employees and community interests, which were felt to have priority over the 
shareholder interests (Lane, Guzek & van Antwerpen, 2015:473). The industry executives 
found it necessary to anticipate and understand the needs the various stakeholders were facing, 
46 
 
even though these executives were confronted by rising pressures on profitability in the midst 
of rising costs, falling commodity prices and a depressed economic environment (2015:476). 
Bosman (2008:35) carried out an empirical study to determine whether those firms listed on 
the JSE TOP40 index and pursuing a stakeholder approach could provide a better return as an 
investment, compared to those pursuing the shareholder approach. The study covered the 
period from 1998 to 2006 and firms were divided into two groups, each comprising ten firms. 
The test group measured the financial performance and value creation of firms pursuing the 
stakeholder approach, whereas the control group measured the financial performance and value 
creation of firms pursuing the shareholder approach (2008:42). The study established that firms 
pursuing the stakeholder approach outperformed those pursuing the shareholder approach, in 
terms of financial performance and value-creation measures (2008:62).  
The findings of this study showed that for the JSE TOP40 firms, the stakeholder objective was 
most pursued, and the shareholder objective the least pursued. The customer-oriented objective 
was observed to be second most popular for those firms. This can be attributed to the following 
international factors. 
Thus a dwindling interest in the shareholder-value objective, post GFC, saw the rise of the 
customer-oriented objective with multinationals such as Apple, Toyota Motors, Amazon, 
Salesforce, Haier Group and Zara focusing instead on delighting customers (Denning, 2013). 
The internet revolution and globalisation empowered customers to have real choices with 
power shifting from the seller to the buyer as customers demanded better, cheaper, and 
personalised goods (Denning, 2013). 
Furthermore, some of the world’s largest multinationals such as Johnson and Johnson and 
Proctor and Gamble had put customer interests as their top priority and by doing so had created 
more shareholder value than those leading firms that pursued a pure shareholder focus (Martin, 
2010:58). By not concentrating on managing shareholder expectations, customer-oriented 
CEOs were free to concentrate on building real businesses (2010:63). The rise of the customer- 
oriented objective in the new millennium was endorsed by Jack Ma, the CEO of e-commerce 
giant Alibaba, who prioritised customers first in a business, followed by employees and lastly 
shareholders (Denning, 2015). 
Overall, the sector analysis of the JSE TOP40 firms does not show any identifiable trends in 
pursuit of a particular firm objective theory. Only a few sectors show any observable trends. 
For most sectors, it was found that the constituent firms pursued either the shareholder, 
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stakeholder or customer-oriented objectives. It was observed that pursuit of the shareholder 
objective is significant in the Financials sector. This could be because financial textbooks in 
business schools strongly advocate for a shareholder objective of the firm, thus influencing the 
managers in these firms to adopt this view. It was also observed that pursuit of the stakeholder 
objective is significant in the Consumer Discretionary sector. This could be due to the very 
nature of the sector where firms have to work with suppliers, wholesalers, warehousing agents, 
advertising and media agents before product delivery. These firms have a delicate job to 
balance and deal with the interests of all these interacting partners. 
Only in the Telecommunication Services sector is a customer-oriented objective significant. 
The success of this sector relies on the number of subscribers each firm has. Their revenue is 
dependent on their customers’ need for voice and data services. Any drop in the quality of their 
services would see their business move away. Ensuring strong customer satisfaction levels is 
pivotal for their long-term survival. 
Several implications arise from the findings of this study, in respect of both the financial 
textbooks and JSE TOP40 firms. 
Thus, analysis of the data from the financial textbooks showed a disconnection between 
academic teaching on the objective of the firm, and what is actually observed in corporate 
South Africa. This leads business school students to believe that shareholder value is the 
appropriate objective of the firm while at the same time, students are being denied a broader 
knowledge of the objective of the firm, even though this is an ongoing debate, with various 
competing views being presented by finance researchers. 
The analysis of the JSE TOP40 firms showed the stakeholder objective to be dominant; this  
asserts that South Africa has broken away from both the Anglo-American and historical Anglo-
Saxon views, in which firms pursue the shareholder-value objective (West, 2009:11; 
Gstraunthaler, 2010:146). In comparison, Morison and Ramsay (2014:441) analysed the 
business objectives of the top 100 firms by market capitalisation, listed on the ASX. Thirty- 
seven firms were identified as pursuing pure shareholder-value interests while 26 firms 
identified with shareholder-value interests but also took into account interests of stakeholders. 
Only 32 firms pursued stakeholder-value interests while the remaining five firms pursued other 
interests (2014:443). Overall, a shareholder-value objective was more significant for 63 of the 
top hundred Australian firms on the ASX (2014:446).  
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The JSE TOP40 firms represent 85% of the total market capitalisation of all JSE-listed firms 
(see 3.3), and so it is very important for policy makers to focus on them. Most of the firms on 
the JSE TOP40 were found to be pursuing a stakeholder or customer-oriented objective of the 
firm, while only eleven firms pursued a shareholder objective. On the one hand, shareholder 
interests are protected, as the South African Company Law has several sections that regulate 
the relationship between the shareholders, directors and the firm (Rossouw et al., 2002:295). 
On the other hand, the draft Companies Bill of 2007 (now Companies Act, 2008) was vague 
on the preferred approach for stakeholder protection (Esser and Dekker, 2008:169). The 
provisions of Section 73(6)(b) of the Companies Act, 2008 require directors to act in the best 
interest of the firm, but do not define whether these promote shareholder or stakeholder 
interests (Muswaka, 2013:69). While King III establishes corporate governance practices for 
stakeholder protection, it is not a law, and non-compliance could not lead to directors being 
held liable (2013:73).  
This puts the spotlight on policy makers and the government think tank to assess whether 
current legislation adequately protects the dominant stakeholder interests; any gaps should be 
addressed. Any instability in the JSE TOP40 firms may have an impact on the domestic market 
that could adversely affect the country’s economy. Any legislative changes would need to 
ensure that stakeholder interests are even better protected.  
The JSE TOP40 firms are large companies with adequate financial resources and intellectual 
human capital; they are able to invest heavily into pursuing a stakeholder or customer objective, 
while also balancing shareholder interests. The findings of this study are applicable to these 
larger firms but perhaps of lesser significance to smaller, often owner-managed, South African 
firms.  
Finally, the study showed that the sample of financial textbooks is not reflecting the robust 
debate on firm objectives. This study recommends that South African academic authors should 
update their financial textbooks to reflect the theories on stakeholder and customer-oriented 
objectives with reference to findings relating to firms listed on the JSE TOP40 index: the 
financial textbooks data had four South African-authored books (see Appendix B). The 
financial textbooks should present the criticism of each objective in the literature, and also 
include the new developments on the firm objective theories proposed by financial researchers. 
This would broaden the knowledge of graduates from South African business schools in their 





This study analysed how the firm objective debate is reflected in financial textbooks, and in 
the Mission, Vision, Values statements of the JSE TOP40 firms. The study establishes that the 
shareholder, stakeholder and customer-oriented theories of the firm are better reflected in the 
MVV statements of the JSE TOP40 firms, than in financial textbooks where the shareholder 
objective was endorsed as the primary one for the firm. 
The introduction to this study highlights that the objective of the firm is the subject of an 
ongoing debate with competing and opposite views presented; the debate remains unresolved 
despite the voluminous literature on it, from empirical and theoretical perspectives. Here, most 
theories on the objective of the firm fall under the categories of Economic and Behavioural.  
In this study, the importance of analysing financial textbooks becomes apparent because most 
of those textbooks place emphasis on the shareholder objective with very little attention given 
to the stakeholder and customer-oriented theories.  Because of this great emphasis on the 
shareholder objective, business school graduates may transit into senior management roles in 
the corporate world being relatively aware of the other objectives. The teachings of financial 
textbooks can exert a strong influence on managers and the firm objective decisions they make.  
In this study, also, the significance of analysing JSE TOP40 firms is highlighted. The JSE is 
the largest stock exchange in Africa and it is a reflection of the health of South Africa’s 
economy.  
The literature review identifies that shareholder theory development is credited to Milton 
Friedman who advocated for a shareholder-wealth maximisation objective of a firm. The 
stakeholder theory development is credited to Edward Freeman who wrote that a firm is 
dependent on various partners that interact with the firm, termed ‘stakeholders;’ Freeman 
advocates maximisation of their interests as the objective of a firm. Stakeholders may include, 
among others, shareholders, debtholders, suppliers, employees, customer, community, and the 
environment. The customer-oriented theory development is credited to Peter Drucker who 
advocated satisfying customer needs as the foremost objective, and stated that a business only 
exists to serve its customers. Alternative and newer theories on the objective of a firm are 
presented, such as the Ethical Decision Model, Enlightened Value Maximization and 
Enlightened Shareholder Value. 
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One criticism of the shareholder theory was that it is narrow minded: it led management to 
focus on short-term profits, and this focus resulted in the collapse of several large and notable 
firms, leading to more regulations. A criticism of the stakeholder theory was that the definition 
of stakeholders is too broad and numerous: a firm could not balance, simultaneously, the 
interests of all its stakeholders even if it tried, partly because stakeholders’ interests can be 
diverging and in conflict with each other. 
The literature review identifies a lack of consensus among financial researchers on what should 
be a singular and unified objective of the firm; this issue is seen as the subject of an ongoing 
debate. This study was conducted to answer the research question in the South African context 
by analysing what a sample of financial textbooks described as the objective of the firm; the 
findings of this textbook analysis are compared with what JSE TOP40 firms have described as 
their objective in their MVV statements. 
The research approach identifies qualitative analysis as the appropriate method for this study 
to adopt. This method provided for astute pattern recognition in large data sets of a descriptive 
nature. The qualitative analysis was conducted using software NVivo, for data from both the 
sample of financial textbooks and the MVV statements of the JSE TOP40 firms. Word 
frequency and coding queries were used to analyse data sets for a shareholder, stakeholder, and 
customer-oriented objective of the firm. 
A sample of twenty financial textbooks was used to obtain data; all these had been published 
in the last five years, and were published in a range of countries from around the world 
including South Africa. For each of the JSE TOP40 firms, their Mission, Vision and Values 
statements were extracted from various sources; these sources were mainly annual reports and 
corporate websites although other sources were also used. 
The findings from the analysis of the financial textbooks and JSE TOP40 firms’ data were 
presented. For financial textbooks, the study found that seventeen of those twenty textbooks 
advocated for a shareholder objective; two advocated for a stakeholder objective, and only one 
textbook advocated for a customer-oriented objective of the firm. For the JSE TOP40 firms, 
the study found that seventeen firms pursued a stakeholder objective, twelve firms pursued a 
customer-oriented objective, and eleven firms pursued a shareholder objective.  
The sector findings show that in the Financial sector, the constituent companies lean heavily 
towards a shareholder objective because of the influence of the teaching of financial textbooks 
on business school graduates. Firms in the Consumer Discretionary sector pursue a stakeholder 
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objective because the nature of the business in which the firms operate requires them to work 
with suppliers, wholesalers, warehousing agents, advertising and media. The 
Telecommunication Services sector pursued a customer-oriented objective because the 
customer is critical for the success of companies in this sector. 
The discussion presented several arguments in the light of the findings. It was felt that it was 
unsurprising for the financial textbooks to advocate a shareholder objective of the firm, as 
financial researchers have pointed out this to be the norm. 
However, the shareholder objective was found to be the least pursued in the JSE TOP40 firms 
and this was largely because of international and domestic factors. Across the globe, those 
firms pursuing a shareholder-value objective were observed to have performed worse than 
others during the GFC period 
The stakeholder objective was the one most frequently encountered in the analysis of the JSE 
TOP40 firms and this was because of domestic factors. Historically, in a post-1994 South 
Africa, government policies and union pressure required firms to act to promote a just social 
distribution of wealth. Thus, key governmental institutes had the duty of protecting 
stakeholders’ interests. Although it is not mandatory for South African firms to adhere to the 
unique King Accords, these endorsed the stakeholder approach to corporate governance. JSE 
regulations were put in place that required listed firms to report their social and environmental 
performances. The state of despair arising from the miners’ plight not only put the focus on the 
mining industry, but also underlined the importance of a stakeholder approach for the attention 
of all firm managers across corporate South Africa.  
The customer-oriented objective pursued by many JSE TOP40 firms can be attributed to 
international factors, which may have influenced the managers of these firms. Post-GFC, 
several notable multinationals have adopted a customer-oriented objective of the firm. 
The findings of this study suggest that the teachings of financial textbooks are disconnected 
from the actual practices of JSE TOP40 firms. The financial textbooks advocate a dominant 
shareholder objective of the firm but this is not reflective of the wider firm objective debate. 
Business school students consider shareholder wealth maximisation to be the appropriate firm 
objective, and are being deprived of a broader vision that considers the various ethical issues. 
It was observed that JSE TOP40 firms reflected the shareholder, stakeholder and customer-
oriented theories of the firm. This diversity of approach indicates that JSE TOP40 firms have 
broken away from away from the Anglo-American and historical Anglo-Saxon views in terms 
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of which, firms pursue the shareholder-value objective. Because the JSE TOP40 firms mostly 
pursued the stakeholder and customer-oriented objectives, policy makers need to assess 
whether current legislation adequately protect shareholders’ interests. Those firms have the 
financial resources and human intellectual capital to pursue either a shareholder, stakeholder 
or customer-oriented objective of the firm. This situation may not be relevant and applicable 
to smaller businesses in South Africa where the main objective is to maximise their wealth. 
This study recommends that South African academic authors should update their financial 
textbooks to reflect the shareholder, stakeholder and customer-oriented theories of the firm. 
This would reflect the diversity of approaches applied by the JSE TOP40 firms, and also would 
reflect the fact that the objective of the firm is the subject of an ongoing debate.  
Some of the limitations of this study include: 
This study would perhaps have benefited if the sample size for financial textbooks data had 
been more than twenty. However, there is a lack of financial textbooks that are authored by 
South Africans as well as credible and this restricted the sample size.  
Although the JSE TOP40 firms were selected according to their market capitalisation, this 
number is rather small. This becomes apparent when conducting a sector analysis. Indeed, as 
reported elsewhere,  two sectors had only a single constituting firm, which made it difficult to 
determine the objective pursued in that sector. 
The financial textbooks and JSE TOP40 data were analysed to determine whether a firm 
pursued shareholder, stakeholder or customer customer-oriented objectives of a firm; these 
three theories were chosen as they have historical depth. This study did not test the data sets 
against the newer theories on the firm’s objective, as identified in the literature review, and this 
leaves scope for future studies that may attempt to do the same.  
In instances where financial textbooks make references to balancing stakeholder and or 
customer additional to shareholder instances. This study focused on which of these three firm 
objective theories had more prominence in financial textbooks. 
Finally, this study takes the objectives pursued by each JSE TOP40 firm at face value. It was 
beyond the scope of this study to validate any claims a firm made in its annual reports and 
elsewhere. Whereby the firms may have window dressed their MVV statements skewing 
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Appendix A – Financial textbooks word frequency query findings 
 
Word Length Count Weighted (%) Similar Words 
maximize 8 19 11.45 maximization, maximize, maximizes, 
maximizing 
shareholder 11 18 10.84 shareholder, shareholders, shareholders' 
wealth 6 17 10.24 wealth 
value 5 15 9.04 value 
increase 8 8 4.82 increase, increased, increases, 
increasing 
share 5 7 4.22 share, shares 
current 7 6 3.61 current 
owners 6 5 3.01 owners 
stockholder 11 5 3.01 stockholder, stockholders 
firm 4 4 2.41 firm 
investors 9 4 2.41 investors 
make 4 3 1.81 make, makes 
price 5 3 1.81 price 
better 6 2 1.20 better 
business 8 2 1.20 business 
company 7 2 1.20 company 
enhance 7 2 1.20 enhance 
generating 10 2 1.20 generating 
objective 9 2 1.20 objective 
per 3 2 1.20 per 
profit 6 2 1.20 profit 
stakeholders 12 2 1.20 stakeholders, stakeholders’ 
stock 5 2 1.20 stock 
although 8 1 0.60 although 
bankers 7 1 0.60 bankers 
best 4 1 0.60 best 
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bond 4 1 0.60 bond 
common 6 1 0.60 common 
compensate 10 1 0.60 compensate 
create 6 1 0.60 create 
economic 8 1 0.60 economic 
equity 6 1 0.60 equity 
financially 11 1 0.60 financially 
fundamental 11 1 0.60 fundamental 
income 6 1 0.60 income 
influence 9 1 0.60 influence 
interests 9 1 0.60 interests 
long 4 1 0.60 long 
maximising 10 1 0.60 maximising 
negotiates 10 1 0.60 negotiates 
number 6 1 0.60 number 
one 3 1 0.60 one 
policies 8 1 0.60 policies 
possible 8 1 0.60 possible 
priority 8 1 0.60 priority 
promote 7 1 0.60 promote 
rich 4 1 0.60 rich 
rights 6 1 0.60 rights 
term 4 1 0.60 term 
thereby 7 1 0.60 thereby 
ultimate 8 1 0.60 ultimate 
variety 7 1 0.60 variety 
wealthier 9 1 0.60 wealthier 
wealthy 7 1 0.60 wealthy 
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Stephen A. Ross 
Randolph Westerfield 
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Pierre Vernimmen UK 
(2014, 4e) 
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Kuo-Ping Chang Singapore 
(2015) 
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Appendix C – JSE TOP40 firms word frequency query findings 
 
Word Length Count Weighted 
(%) 
Similar Words 
value 5 20 6.90 value 
stakeholders 12 15 5.17 stakeholder, stakeholders 
shareholders 12 14 4.83 shareholder, shareholders, shareholders’, 
shareholding 
customers 9 11 3.79 customer, customers, customers’ 
delivering 10 11 3.79 deliver, delivering 
create 6 8 2.76 create, creating 
best 4 7 2.41 best 
creation 8 6 2.07 creation 
providing 9 6 2.07 provide, provided, provider, provides, 
providing 
term 4 6 2.07 term 
long 4 5 1.72 long 
returns 7 5 1.72 return, returns 
superior 8 5 1.72 superior 
client 6 4 1.38 client, clients 
consumer 8 4 1.38 consumer 
experience 10 4 1.38 experience, experiences 
sustainable 11 4 1.38 sustainable 
world 5 4 1.38 world 
benefits 8 3 1.03 benefit, benefits 
brands 6 3 1.03 branded, brands 
communities 11 3 1.03 communities, community 
leader 6 3 1.03 leader 
leading 7 3 1.03 leading 
lives 5 3 1.03 lives 
add 3 2 0.69 add, adds 
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admired 7 2 0.69 admired 
bank 4 2 0.69 bank 
business 8 2 0.69 business 
capital 7 2 0.69 capital 
care 4 2 0.69 care, caring 
company 7 2 0.69 company 
distinct 8 2 0.69 distinct, distinctive 
employees 9 2 0.69 employees 
focus 5 2 0.69 focus, focused 
goods 5 2 0.69 goods 
grow 4 2 0.69 grow, growing 
investing 9 2 0.69 investing, investments 
partners 8 2 0.69 partners, partners’ 
positive 8 2 0.69 positive 
possible 8 2 0.69 possible 
quality 7 2 0.69 quality 
service 7 2 0.69 service, services 
society 7 2 0.69 society 
wealth 6 2 0.69 wealth 
whole 5 2 0.69 whole 
achieve 7 1 0.34 achieve 
act 3 1 0.34 act 
approach 8 1 0.34 approach 
aspirational 12 1 0.34 aspirational 
association 11 1 0.34 association 
bee 3 1 0.34 bee 
bold 4 1 0.34 bold 
brighter 8 1 0.34 brighter 
broader 7 1 0.34 broader 
centre 6 1 0.34 centre 
championing 11 1 0.34 championing 
choice 6 1 0.34 choice 
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class 5 1 0.34 class 
colleagues 10 1 0.34 colleagues 
consistently 12 1 0.34 consistently 
cost 4 1 0.34 cost 
delivery 8 1 0.34 delivery 
digital 7 1 0.34 digital 
driving 7 1 0.34 driving 
economic 8 1 0.34 economic 
effective 9 1 0.34 effective 
enable 6 1 0.34 enable 
ensure 6 1 0.34 ensure 
environments 12 1 0.34 environments 
excellence 10 1 0.34 excellence 
exceptional 11 1 0.34 exceptional 
exist 5 1 0.34 exist 
facilities 10 1 0.34 facilities 
fairness 8 1 0.34 fairness 
fast 4 1 0.34 fast 
financial 9 1 0.34 financial 
firstrand 9 1 0.34 firstrand 
flexibility 11 1 0.34 flexibility 
franchise 9 1 0.34 franchise 
future 6 1 0.34 future 
give 4 1 0.34 give 
global 6 1 0.34 global 
greater 7 1 0.34 greater 
group 5 1 0.34 group 
growth 6 1 0.34 growth 
healthcare 10 1 0.34 healthcare 
high 4 1 0.34 high 
higher 6 1 0.34 higher 
honesty 7 1 0.34 honesty 
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imperial 8 1 0.34 imperial 
improvement 11 1 0.34 improvement 
including 9 1 0.34 including 
informed 8 1 0.34 informed 
insurance 9 1 0.34 insurance 
interaction 11 1 0.34 interaction 
investors 9 1 0.34 investors 
longer 6 1 0.34 longer 
lot 3 1 0.34 lot 
make 4 1 0.34 make 





Appendix D – JSE TOP40 firms coding query findings 
 
Shareholder objective Stakeholder objective Customer-oriented objective 
Anglo American PLC AngloGold Ashanti Ltd Anglo American Platinum Ltd 
BHP Billiton PLC Aspen Pharmacare Holdings Ltd 
British American Tobacco 
PLC 
Capital & Counties Properties PLC Barclays Africa Group Ltd Intu Properties PLC 
FirstRand Ltd Bidvest Group Ltd/The Investec Ltd/PLC 
Naspers Ltd 
Cie Financiere Richemont SA 
Life Healthcare Group 
Holdings Ltd 
Rand Merchant Insurance Holdings Ltd Discovery Ltd Mediclinic International Ltd 
Reinet Investments SCA Growthpoint Properties Ltd Mondi Ltd/PLC 
Remgro Ltd Impala Platinum Holdings Ltd MTN Group Ltd 
RMB Holdings Ltd Imperial Holdings Ltd Standard Bank Group Ltd 
SABMiller PLC Kumba Iron Ore Ltd Tiger Brands Ltd 
Sanlam Ltd Mr Price Group Ltd Vodacom Group Ltd 
  Nedbank Group Ltd Woolworths Holdings Ltd/SA 
  Netcare Ltd   
  Old Mutual PLC   
  Sasol Ltd   
  Shoprite Holdings Ltd   
  
Steinhoff International Holdings 
Ltd   





Appendix E – JSE TOP40 firms’ objective by GICS Sector 
 
GICS Sector Firms Objective 
Consumer Discretionary (6) Woolworths Holdings Ltd/SA Customer 
  Imperial Holdings Ltd Stakeholder 
  Steinhoff International Holdings Ltd Stakeholder 
  Mr Price Group Ltd Stakeholder 
  Cie Financiere Richemont SA Stakeholder 
  Naspers Ltd Shareholder 
Consumer Staples (4) SABMiller PLC Shareholder 
  Tiger Brands Ltd Customer 
  Shoprite Holdings Ltd Stakeholder 
  British American Tobacco PLC Customer 
Energy (1) Sasol Ltd Stakeholder 
Financials (15) Growthpoint Properties Ltd Stakeholder 
  Barclays Africa Group Ltd Stakeholder 
  Sanlam Ltd Shareholder 
  Remgro Ltd Shareholder 
  Standard Bank Group Ltd Customer 
  Investec Ltd/PLC Customer 
  FirstRand Ltd Shareholder 
  RMB Holdings Ltd Shareholder 
  Reinet Investments SCA Shareholder 
  Capital & Counties Properties PLC Shareholder 
  Rand Merchant Insurance Holdings Ltd Shareholder 
  Old Mutual PLC Stakeholder 
  Nedbank Group Ltd Stakeholder 
  Discovery Ltd Stakeholder 
  Intu Properties PLC Customer 
Health Care (4) Aspen Pharmacare Holdings Ltd Stakeholder 
  Mediclinic International Ltd Customer 
  Netcare Ltd Stakeholder 
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  Life Healthcare Group Holdings Ltd Customer 
Industrials (1) Bidvest Group Ltd/The Stakeholder 
Materials (7) Mondi Ltd/PLC Customer 
  Impala Platinum Holdings Ltd Stakeholder 
  Anglo American Platinum Ltd Customer 
  AngloGold Ashanti Ltd Stakeholder 
  Anglo American PLC Shareholder 
  Kumba Iron Ore Ltd Stakeholder 
  BHP Billiton PLC Shareholder 
Telecommunication Services (2) MTN Group Ltd Customer 
  Vodacom Group Ltd Customer 
 
 
